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Although it is widely appreciated that rights of exit from a
legal order can be important and valuable, there currently exists
no adequate account of the relationship between exit rights and
legitimacy. This Article cures that deficiency by describing the
contribution made by exit rights to the legitimacy of a legal
order-a contribution that I call the "exit legitimacy"of that legal
order-and offers two accounts of its normative significance. On
the "thin" account, exit rights operationalize consent by making
it more genuine, more ascertainable, and more closely related to
relevant acts and relationships of governance; on the "thick"
account, exit rights instantiate a value that I call 'political
autonomy." The Article offers grounds to think that, while exit
legitimacy is salient in legal orders of all kinds, it is particularly
significant for international orders and institutions, which often
lack the democratic, traditional, and other legitimating resources
available to their national equivalents. Finally, to complete the
account of exit legitimacy, the Article considers and responds to
four of the strongest objections to which it appears vulnerable. It
demonstrates that none of these objections convincingly
undermines the case for this unique ground of legitimacy, and
that each provides useful guidance for promoting exit legitimacy
in legal orders of all kinds.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The search for legitimacy-the search for reasons to accept or
comply with legal orders and institutions, and with the norms and
decisions they announce-may be the oldest problem of political
theory, but the explosive emergence of international orders and
institutions since 1945 has unleashed a new version of that problem.
This new version presents a sharp challenge to our existing toolkit of
solutions: familiar accounts of legitimacy, developed with the nation-
state in mind, often fail to convince at the international level. But that
very fact makes the international sphere a promising setting in which
to identify and explore sources of legitimacy that lie hidden from view
in national orders, where democracy, tradition, participation, and the
sheer weight of history can easily dominate the picture. In this Article,
I will argue that one of the most important of these sources is the exit
right, which makes a distinctive-perhaps even a foundational-
legitimating contribution that I will call the exit legitimacy of that
order.' And while exit legitimacy can play an important role in a wide
variety of orders and institutions, from private associations and
1. The words "exit," "rights," and "legitimacy" are of course freighted with
ambiguity, and I use at least one of them in a slightly idiosyncratic sense. Those wishing
to find out immediately what precisely I have in mind may want to jump to Section III.A.
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nation-states to international organizations, there are reasons to think
that it is particularly significant at the international level.
Rights and mechanisms of "exit" (by which I mean the voluntary
renunciation by a governed entity of its membership of an order or
institution, along with all the duties, obligations, rights, and benefits
that pertain thereto) have interested positive political theorists, liberal
rights scholars, social contractarians, international lawyers, and those
concerned with secession and self-determination. And while these
scholars have illuminated many of the important consequences,
benefits, and difficulties associated with exit rights, the relationship
between exit and legitimacy has not been seriously explored, except in
contractarian scholarship (where, as we shall see, its treatment has
been unsatisfactory). One important form of exit right in particular-
the right of a state to exit from an international institution-has
received virtually no serious attention in normative theory. But this
Article will argue that orders and institutions that protect the exit
right (e.g., the European Union since the Lisbon Treaty, as the United
Kingdom has reminded us very recently with the astonishing outcome
of the "Brexit" referendum) enjoy a crucial legitimating resource that
is unavailable to those that do not (e.g., the United Nations).
While I will lay my focus primarily on international institutions, I
will make my case in terms that are as general as possible, reflecting
my view that rights of exit can make a material contribution to the
legitimacy of other orders (such as nation-states) too. One consequence
of this approach is that I will have relatively little to say in this
contribution about law as such: I will reserve for subsequent work the
difficult problems of institutionalizing the value of exit legitimacy in
specific legal orders and institutions, and the challenges of balancing
the demands of exit legitimacy against the myriad of other
considerations that typically constrain institutional design or reform.
So those expecting specific doctrinal prescriptions for national or
international legal orders will be disappointed. My concern here will
be very strictly with stating and defending in normative theory the
proposition that exit rights ground a particular and valuable source of
legitimacy in legal orders, particularly, but not exclusively,
international ones.
Accordingly, in the following pages I will set out the case for exit
legitimacy and offer two accounts of its normative force. The first, a
"thin" account of exit legitimacy, rests upon the broad consensus in
international law and liberal thought that consent is an important
(perhaps even the dominant) source of legitimacy. This thin account
argues that exit rights operationalize consent by making consent more
genuine, more ascertainable, and more closely related to the relevant
act or situation of governance, while avoiding recourse to doubtful
notions of promise or contract. The second, a "thick" account of exit
legitimacy, is much more complex and ambitious. On this thick
account, exit rights instantiate what I call political autonomy: the
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ordering of a political order or institution such that the governed
entities are-strictly and literally-free, equal, and independent. I
offer here only a sketch of the broader implications of political
autonomy.
Finally, I will consider four of the strongest objections that might
be directed at exit legitimacy. Put briefly, they are as follows: first, that
exit is too difficult or costly to be meaningful in practice; second, that,
even when exit is practicable, it is too insubstantial and weak to do the
normative work asked of it; third, that, even if exit rights are in some
sense desirable, they generate unhelpful and destructive incentives
and behaviors among governed entities; and, fourth, that exit rights
should not allow an entity with outstanding or undischarged
obligations to exit the political order or institution. I will show that
none of these objections is fatal and that each of them provides helpful
guidance for projects of institutional design motivated by the
normative appeal of exit legitimacy.
II. ExIT IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
A. The Salience of Exit
The practical importance of the right of exit blazes from the pages
of history. For centuries, restrictions on exit have been associated with
oppression and privation,2 exemplified by the ties that bound
Ptolemaic peasants or English villeins to their land,3 the English Poor
Laws,4 and the odious Fugitive Slave Acts.5 Conversely, exit rights in
various forms feature in many of the great achievements of
emancipation, from the Delphic manumission rite with its explicit
conferral upon the freed person of the right to "house where he desires"
and to "dwell in whatever city-state he wishes,"6 through the Magna
Carta with its right to "leave and return to our kingdom unharmed and
without fear, by land or water, preserving his allegiance to us, except
in time of war,"7 to the most famous exit of all, the Declaration of
Independence.
2. See generally, e.g., ALAN DowTY, CLOSED BORDERS: THE CONTEMPORARY
ASSAULT ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT (1987) (discussing the history of human emigration
and expulsion and government motives for such policies).
3. See, e.g., J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 468
(2002) (villeins in feudal England); W. L. Westermann, Between Slavery and Freedom,
50 AM. HIST. REV. 213, 219 (1945) (peasants in Greco-Roman Egypt).
4. See, e.g., 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 152-57 (Liberty Press 1981) (1776).
5. See, e.g., STANLEY W. CAMPBELL, THE SLAVE CATCHERS: ENFORCEMENT OF
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAw, 1850-1860 (1970).
6. Westermann, supra note 3, at 216.
7. MAGNA CARTA cl. 42 (1215), http://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-
carta-english-translation [https://perma.cc/5UDN-CXUP] (archived Jan. 21, 2017).
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In our own era, too, oppression and suffering have walked hand-
in-hand with exit restrictions. Exit rights were prominently curtailed
by Bolshevik Russia,8 Nazi Germany,9 various states during the Cold
War (most famously manifested in the Berlin Wall),10 and, until very
recently, Communist Cuba." Still today, exit restrictions are imposed
by North Korea on its citizens,12 by Israel on Palestinians in the
Occupied Territories,'3 and by Iran on women.14 Conversely, legal
instruments for the protection of fundamental rights frequently
include rights of exit and emigration: a range of twentieth-century
constitutional or quasi-constitutional instruments do so," as do a
8. See, e.g., Yuri Feltshinsky, The Legal Foundations of the Immigration and
Emigration Policy of the USSR, 1917-27, 34 SOVIET STUD. 327, 339-42 (1982).
9. See REICHSSICHERHEITSHAUPTAMT [REICH SECURITY MAIN OFFICE], Order
Banning the Emigration of Jews from the Reich, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY (Oct. 23,
1941), https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.orgjsource/Holocaustlemigban.html [https://perma
.cc/RY4B-AJBC] (archived Jan. 21, 2017).
10. See Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic
Republic: An Essay in Conceptual History, 45 WORLD POL. 173, 178-86 (1993).
11. See, e.g., Tracy Wilkinson, Cubans No Longer Need Special Exit Permit to
Travel OffIsland, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/15/
world/la-fg-wn-cuba-travel-reform-20130114 [https://perma.cc/9HFT-RV72] (archived
Jan. 19, 2017).
12. See, e.g., Thomas Spoorenberg & Daniel Schwekendiek, Demographic
Changes in North Korea: 1993-2008, 38 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 133, 139 (2012) (noting
that "the country has remained closed for decades and international migration can be
considered non-existent").
13. See, e.g., MIGRATION POL'Y. CTR., MIGRATION FACTS: PALESTINE (April 2013),
http://www.migrationpolicycentre.euldocs/factsheets/Factsheet%2OPalestine.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8GNW-4MQF] (archived Jan. 19, 2017).
14. In one recent and high-profile example, the captain of an Iranian women's
football team was unable to participate in an international tournament when her
husband refused to grant permission to travel. See Saeed Kamali Dehghan, Husband
bars Iranian footballer from Asian championships, GUARDIAN (Sept. 16, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/16/husband-bars-iranian-footballer-from-
asian-championships [https://perma.cc/2XJA-8P99] (archived Jan. 19, 2017).
15. See, e.g., Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982,
c. 6 (U.K.) ("Every citizen of Canada has the right to enter, remain in and leave
Canada."); XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 31 (H.K.) ("Hong Kong residents shall have freedom
of movement within the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and freedom of
emigration to other countries and regions. They shall have freedom to travel and to enter
or leave the Region. Unless restrained by law, holders of valid travel documents shall be
free to leave the Region without special authorization."); Art 16 COSTITUZIONE [Cost.]
(It.) ("Every citizen is free to leave the territory of the republic and return to it,
notwithstanding any legal obligations."); NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION],
art. 22 (Japan) ("Freedom of all persons to move to a foreign country and to divest
themselves of their nationality shall be inviolate."); KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI
FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 27(2) (Russ) ("Everyone may freely leave
the Russian Federation. Citizens of the Russian Federation shall have the right to freely
return to the Russian Federation."); S. AFR. CONST., 1996, art. 21(2) ("Everyone has the
right to leave the Republic."); Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 5752
(Isr.) ("All persons are free to leave Israel."). Other constitutional provisions have been
interpreted to include an exit right: thus, for example, Article 2(1) of the German Basic
Law is understood to confer such a right. I owe this observation to Thomas Streinz.
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number of international and regional agreements for the protection of
human rights.16 Both the European Union and the United States
guarantee citizens the right to exit from their component states
(although not, oddly, from the unions themselves).'7
So there are compelling anecdotal grounds, at the very least, to
suggest a connection between the spread of exit rights and modern
liberal constitutional democracy. And it is not hard to understand why
they might be connected: at the heart of much liberal normative theory
is "[t]he personal liberty . . . not to be coerced into, or trapped within,
ways of life"' 8 and the right to have one's fundamental relationships be
voluntary rather than imposed.'9 We might also note some
implications of exit rights in positive political theory that appeal to the
liberal project: for example, as Albert Hirschman famously argued, the
threat of exit can deter organizational "decline" that would disserve
individual members.20 When an exit right exists, the desire to avoid
members rushing for the door may help to keep an order or institution
focused on serving its members, while regimes that are bent upon
oppression and expropriation will often find it necessary to restrict
exit.2 1
But while an exit right can be helpful and emancipatory in these
and other ways, it would be crude not to add the qualification that exit
rights are no substitute for justice, fairness, efficiency, or any form of
rightness within an order or institution. An exit right alone does not
normally solve internal problems. Those who are unable or unwilling
to resort to exit may find that they bear an unjustly heavy share of the
burden of institutional life, and, even for those who are able and willing
to exit, it is pretty thin gruel to reduce our notions of justice and
16. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 12, June 27, 1981, 1520
U.N.T.S. 26363 ("Every individual shall have the right to leave any country including
his own, and to return to his country."); American Convention on Human Rights art. 22,
Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143 ("Every person has the right to leave any country freely,
including his own."); G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights art. 12 (Dec. 16, 1966) ("Everyone shall be free to leave any country,
including his own."); European Convention on Human Rights, Protocol No. 4 art. 2, Sept.
16, 1963, ETS no. 46 ("Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.");
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) ("Everyone
has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country").
17. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 45, Dec. 7,
2000, 2007 O.J. (C 303) 1; Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254
(1974).
18. William Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, 105 ETHICS 516, 522 (1995).
19. Harry Beran, A Liberal Theory of Secession, 32 POL. STUD. 21, 26 (1984)
("Liberalism grants [the right to decide upon political relationships to] individual citizens
by acknowledging their right to emigrate and to change their nationality.").
20. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 21-29 (1970).
21. See, e.g., Andrew Shorten, Constitutional Secession Rights, Exit Threats and
Multinational Democracy, 62 POL. STUD. 99, 100 (2014); Leslie Green, Rights of Exit, 4
LEGAL THEORY 165, 171 (1998).
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fairness to the proposition "you can take it or leave it." These points
have been powerfully made, for example, by feminist theorists, who
point out that women and girls may be particularly unable to avail
themselves of exit rights in many cultures;22 by scholars of "regulatory
competition," who recognize that the prospect of "capital flight" may
introduce a bias in favor of mobile capital and against less mobile
entities;23 and by scholars of federalism, who note that many types of
undesirable state behavior (like "holdup" when the cooperation of
multiple jurisdictions is required) are simply not susceptible to the
discipline that exit rights provide.24 These and other writers caution
against thinking of exit as a cure-all for problems of justice and fairness
inside orders and institutions, and they are surely right to do so. If the
design of political institutions can be likened to designing a house that
is at some risk of fire, then an exit right is like a fire escape-our sense
that we should include one should not detract from our vigor in
minimizing the chances of fire, or fighting one if it breaks out. An exit
right is rarely enough, but having one beats the alternative.
We have, so far, mainly spoken of national orders. But when the
focus shifts to international orders and institutions-terms that I use
loosely and interchangeably throughout this Article to encompass
everything from international organizations to treaties, and even
customary international law itself-we find that many of the same
principles are relevant here too. International orders and institutions
apply rules and norms to states, adjudicate disputes and claims, and
frequently impose and enforce obligations and duties. Their design and
operation may be just or unjust, efficient or inefficient, fair or unfair,
just like those at the national level. And, if we are interested, for
whatever reason, in the situation of states in international
institutions-a point we will bracket for later discussion, but not one
that is a great stretch within liberal theory,25 so long as we do not
afford states "special moral primacy" over individuals26-then we see
22. See, e.g., Susan Moller Okin, "Mistresses of Their Own Destiny": Group
Rights, Gender, and Realistic Rights of Exit, 112 ETHICS 205, 216 (2002); Ayelet
Schachar, On Citizenship and Multicultural Vulnerability, 28 POL. THEORY 64, 79-80
(2000).
23. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills Jr., Compared to What? Tiebout and the
Comparative Merits of Congress and the States in Constitutional Federalism, in THE
TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE OATES
248 (William Fischel ed., 2006).
24. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 147, 154-65 (1992).
25. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 221 n.8 (Columbia 2005)
(1993) ("It is incorrect to say that liberalism focuses solely on the rights of individuals;
rather, the rights it recognizes are to protect associations, smaller groups, and
individuals, all from one another in an appropriate balance specified by its guiding
principles of justice.") [hereinafter POLITICAL LIBERALISM].
26. Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, 20 POL. THEORY 105,
112 (1992).
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that the rights of exit and withdrawal for states, as such, in
international orders and institutions might be important for many of
the same reasons that they are important for individuals in states. To
put it another way, if we think it meaningful not just to look through
the state to the individuals beneath, but also to consider the state as a
unified, reified entity that can be meaningfully analyzed in normative
theory as a source and subject of claims, albeit only for some purposes,
then we may find our eye drawn to exit rights for states.
Even a brief study of such "exit rights for states" reveals that the
modern liberal practice of building an exit door into the wall of the state
has not reliably filtered into the design of international institutions. To
be sure, many iAternational organizations and treaty systems do
contain rights of withdrawal.27 These provisions often incorporate a
notice period, and occasionally further restrictions.2 8 Moreover, the
absence of an explicit withdrawal provision in a founding treaty does
not always mean there is no such right under international law: the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides for a right of
withdrawal (i.e., "denunciation") with at least one year's notice in the
event that (1) a withdrawal right is implicit in the treaty or (2) the
parties understood when negotiating the treaty that such a right was
included.29 The Convention also allows, in most but not all cases,
withdrawal from a treaty in light of a fundamental change of essential
circumstances (codifying the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus).3 0 But
these are rare cases; usually no exit provision means no exit right.
It is remarkable that many of the constructions of international
law, including some of its proudest cathedrals, offer no exit right. This
includes, most famously, the United Nations,3 ' as well as the
Association of South East Asian Nations,3 2 the Caribbean
27. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 127, Jul. 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90; ECOWAS Revised Treaty art. 91, Jul. 24, 1993, 35 I.L.M. 660;
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 317, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
3; Charter of the Organization for African Unity art. XXXI, May 25, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S.
39; North Atlantic Treaty art. 13, Apr. 4, 1949, 34 U.N.T.S. 243; Articles of Agreement
of the International Bank for Construction and Redevelopment art. VI, Dec. 27, 1945, 2
U.N.T.S. 20; Articles of Agreement of the IMF, art. XXVI, July 22, 1944, 60 Stat. 1401, 2
U.N.T.S. 39; European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 16, art. 58; American
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 16, art. 78.
28. See, e.g., Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. X, Jul. 1,
1968, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
29. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 56, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
30. Id. art. 62.
31. Egon Schwelb, Withdrawal from the United Nations: The Indonesian
Intermezzo, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 661, 661 (1967).




Community,33 the Organization of American States,3 4 the World
Health Organization,35 and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, to name but a few.36 The European Union's single
currency "Eurozone" also makes no provision for exit.3 7 It is not even
clear whether the most pervasive international institution of all-
customary international law-allows for such a right: in fact, only
recently has that question been seriously explored in modern
scholarship.38
Perhaps the lack of exit rights in these and other international
institutions has been of limited importance-and has escaped serious
scrutiny in normative theory-to date because the design and
operation of international institutions has been so much less
determinative of political and social reality than has the design and
operation of states.3 9 Indeed, history has repeatedly shown that states
are in many cases perfectly capable of "withdrawing" from, or at least
suspending cooperation with, international institutions, even when no
exit right is available dejure.40 If we think of the structures of national
political orders as buildings wrought in brick and stone-which firmly
limit the movement of the governed entities within with solid,
practically impenetrable walls-we would have to recognize that
33. Cf. Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community
including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy, May 07, 2001, 2259 U.N.T.S. 259.
34. Cf. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 119
U.N.T.S. 3.
35. Cf. Constitution of the World Health Organization, Jul. 22, 1946, 14 U.N.T.S. 185.
36. Cf. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 16.
37. See generally Phoebus Athanassiou, Withdrawal and Expulsion from the EU
and EMU: Some Reflections (Eur. Cent. Bank Legal, Working Paper Series No. 10, 2009).
38. See Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International
Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202, 205 (2010).
39. Daniel Bodansky makes a similar point, suggesting that "until recently
international institutions have generally been so weak-they have exercised so little
authority-that the issue of their legitimacy has barely arisen." Daniel Bodansky, The
Legitimacy Of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International
Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596, 597 (1999).
40. A handful of high-profile examples present themselves (ignoring
withdrawals from institutions, like UNESCO, that offer an explicit withdrawal right):
the Soviet Union purportedly withdrew from the WHO in the 1950s; Indonesia from the
United Nations in 1965; North Korea from the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights in 1997, and the United States from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations in 2005. In each case except he last, the relevant
state returned to the order soon afterward, and the institution in question continued
during and after the "withdrawal" to adhere to the view that the purported exiter never
actually left, but merely suspended their activities of cooperation. See, e.g., John Quigley,
The United States' Withdrawal from International Court of Justice Jurisdiction in
Consular Cases: Reasons and Consequences, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 263, 298-303
(2009); Elizabeth Evatt, Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the ICCPR:
Denunciation as an Exercise of the Right of Self-Defence?, 5 AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 215
(1999); Nathan Feinberg, Unilateral Withdrawal from an International Organization, 39
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 189, 190 (1964); Schwelb, supra note 31.
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international organizations do nothing of the kind. We might think of
them instead as gardens laid out in bushes and hedges, forming waist-
height barriers that guide and channel state conduct, but through
which states retain the ability to crash at points of genuine need. And
perhaps so (though the argument looks a better fit for some cases than
others). But the "exit question" will become much sharper as
international organizations become more powerful, more intrusive,
more responsible for distributing resources and regulating access to
profitable activities, and more effective in enforcing their rules. So-to
stick with our metaphor-it may be best to address the issue of exit
before the foliage grows so high and dense that states can no longer
simply push through in a pinch.
One final comment. It is possible, and may be advantageous, to
empower some entity other than the order or institution itself to
enforce and protect the right of exit, just as the state is called upon to
protect the individual's right of exit from associations and
organizations (and even family units) in much liberal theory.41 And
indeed, rights of exit from national orders may be protected not only by
national instruments (national constitutions, laws, and so on) but also
by international instruments and institutions like the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, regional human rights bodies,
and integration projects like the European Union (which, in its system
for the "free movement of persons," grants certain rights of internal
exit-as well as entry rights-to natural persons and enforces them
against EU Member StateS42). Nor is this wholly a modern innovation:
the use of international institutions to guarantee rights of exit from
national orders finds one intriguing early parallel in the 1555 Peace of
Augsburg. As Benjamin Kaplan puts it,
[t]he famous catchphrase cuius regio, eius religio was coined ... by a Lutheran
jurist to summarize the central clauses of this treaty. "Cuius regio" meant that
"he whose territory" it was had the right to impose his faith (Catholic or
Lutheran) on his subjects, free from outside interference. If subjects dissented
from their ruler's choice, they had only the right to emigrate (us emigrandi).43
41. See, e.g., Oonagh Reitman, On Exit, in MINORITIES WITHIN MINORITIES:
EQUALITY, RIGHTS AND DIVERSITY 189 (Avigail Eisenberg & Jeff Spinner-Haley eds.,
2005) (analyzing the role of secular and religious authorities in the context of divorce).
42. See, e.g., Case C-249/11, Hristo Byankov v. Glaven sekretar na Ministerstvo
na vatreshnite raboti, ECLI:EDU:C:2012:608; Case C-434/10, Petar Aladzhov v.
Zamestnik direktor na Stolichna direktsia na vatreshnite raboti kam Ministerstvo na
vatreshnite raboti, 2011 E.C.R. 111659; Case C-430/10, Hristo Gaydarov v. Director na
Glavna direktsia "Ohranitelna politsia" pri Ministerstvo na vatreshnite raboti, 2011
E.C.R. 1-11637; Case C-33/07, Ministerul Administraiei §i Internelor - Directia Generals
de Payapoarte Bucuresti v. Gheorge Jipa, 2008 E.C.R. 1-05157. For a helpful discussion,
see Adam Lazowski, "Darling You Are Not Going Anywhere": The Right to Exit and
Restrictions in EU Law, 40 EUR. L. REV. 877 (2015).
43. BENJAMIN J. KAPLAN, DIVIDED BY FAITH: RELIGIOUS CONFLICT AND THE
PRACTICE OF TOLERATION IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 104 (2009).
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Thus, two exit rights were enshrined in one international
instrument: a right for states to exit from the jurisdiction of the Church
(cuius regio) and a right for natural persons to exit from the jurisdiction
of their state (jus emigrandi).
B. The Neglected Relationship between Exit and Legitimacy
Despite the evident salience of exit, the relationship between exit
and legitimacy has not been satisfactorily developed in either political
theory or legal scholarship, and the idea that exit rights make a
distinctive contribution to legitimacy remains obscure and largely
unexplored. I acknowledge at the outset, but will not attempt to
summarize or discuss here, the tremendously illuminating body of
work in positive political theory on the implications of exit rights, in
which Albert Hirschman's sublime little book is of course
preeminent.44 We will discuss some of this work below, but it will
suffice for now to simply acknowledge that this literature is not
primarily concerned with normative questions.4 5 This Section
considers very briefly four other contexts in which political theorists
and international lawyers have considered exit rights and their
implications: (1) liberal rights theory, (2) social contract theory, (3)
international legal scholarship, and (4) secession and self-
determination. As we will see, a satisfactory account of the relationship
between exit and legitimacy has yet to be offered.
1. Liberal Rights Theory
Most liberal rights theorists acknowledge the importance of the
right to exit from organizations and institutions of all kinds, including
the right to emigrate from a state or political order.46 This is often
44. See generally HIRSCHMAN, supra note 20.
45. See infra Section TV.C (discussing relationship between exit, incentives, and
behavior in light of applicable positive theory).
46. I concentrate in the text on contemporary theorists and am not primarily
concerned here with intellectual history, but thoughtful commentary on the implications
and value of exit rights in early modern liberal thought can be discerned at least as far
back as the work of Althusius, Montesquieu, Locke, and-perhaps above all-Vattel. See
JOHANNES ALTHUSIUS, POLITICA 196-98 (Liberty Press 1995) (1614) (arguing that, in
response to tyranny, citizens should "avoid obedience not by resisting, but by fleeing");
JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 392-94 (Cambridge 1960) (1689)
("[W]henever the Owner [of land], who has given nothing but such a tacit Consent to the
Government, will, by Donation, Sale, or otherwise, quit the said Possession, he is at
liberty to go and incorporate himself into any other Commonwealth, or to agree with
others to being a new one, in vacuis locisl[.");CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 212 (Cambridge 1989) (1748) ("The Persian
custom that permits anyone to leave the kingdom who wants to, is very good; and though
the opposite usage had its origin in despotism, where subjects were regarded as
slaves . . . nevertheless, the Persian practice is very good in despotisms, where fear of
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understood to flow from liberalism's central commitment to autonomy
(i.e., the proposition that the individual should not be coerced into a
particular way of living except to the extent necessary to guarantee the
equal freedom of others).47 But there are other resources in liberal
theory to explain why exit rights may be desirable or appropriate. For
example, William Galston has invoked considerations of diversity to
argue that a right to exit from organizations and institutions may
justify the tolerance, in a liberal order, of illiberal practices within
those groups.48 Perhaps the most vigorous account of liberalism's
relationship to exit is found in the work of Chandran Kukathas, who
has written that the right to exit "has to be the individual's
fundamental right; it is also his only fundamental right, all other rights
being either derivative of this right, or rights granted by the
community [that he or she has chosen not to leave] ."49 As these and
other writers show, the premises of liberalism furnish ample resources
to support rights of exit from orders and institutions.
As noted above, however, this account has been sharply qualified
by those who point out that exit does not cure violations of liberal
rights, and that exit is seldom available on equal terms to all members.
The essential point is that "[a] violation of civil liberties does not
become tolerable just because citizens may emigrate, although it is
true that, if they may not, then things are even worse."5 0 One
particularly powerful line of attack, as we have already seen, has come
from feminist theory: Susan Moller Okin, for example, has
compellingly demonstrated that exit rights are imperfectly available in
practice, particularly to girls and women.5 1 Moreover, she notes that
exit rights offer scant consolation to "women or members of other
oppressed groups who are deeply attached to their cultures but not to
their oppressive aspects," and argues that a just liberal order must not
only guarantee the right to exit from groups within it but must also
the people's fleeing or departing with what they owe checks or moderates the persecution
of pashas and extortioners.") (footnote omitted); EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS
220-33 (Liberty Press 2008) (1758) ("[T]he sovereign abuses his power, and.reduces his
subjects to an insupportable slavery, if he refuses them permission to travel for their
own advantage, when he might grant it to them without inconvenience, and without
danger to the state. Nay it will presently appear that, on certain occasions, he cannot,
under any pretext, detain persons who wish to quit the country with the intention of
abandoning it for ever.').
47. See Beran, supra note 19, at 26 ("Liberalism grants [the right to decide upon
political relationships to] individual citizens by acknowledging their right to emigrate
and to change their nationality"); Galston, supra note 18, at 517-18 ("The personal
liberty the liberal state must defend is the liberty not to be coerced into, or trapped
within, ways of life.").
48. See Galston, supra note 18, at 533.
49. Kukathas, supra note 26, at 116-17. See Chandran Kukathas, Cultural
Toleration, 39 NOMOS 69, 95-97 (1997) [hereinafter Kukathas, Cultural Toleration].
50. Green, supra note 21, at 165.
51. See Okin, supra note 22, at 216-22.
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take responsibility for correcting injustice within it. 52 Likewise, Ayelet
Schachar has rejected crude accounts in which "an injured insider
should be the one to abandon the very center of her life, family, and
community," particularly as "traditionally less powerful group
members, such as women, are precisely those members who commonly
lack the economic stability, cultural 'know-how,' language skills,
connections, and self-confidence needed to successfully exit from their
minority communities."53
Thus, liberal rights theorists have done a great deal to articulate
both the value and the limits of exit rights. But they have not been
concerned with the distinctive role of exit rights in giving content-
neutral reasons to acknowledge the claims of an order or institution to
acceptance or compliance, that is, the relationship between exit and
legitimacy. For this, we must look elsewhere.
2. Social Contract Theory
The most developed account of the relationship between exit and
legitimacy can be found in social contract theory. Exit finds a role here
in answering a basic but thorny question raised by the notion of the
social contract: if we suppose that each citizen can enter into an
agreement for himself or herself but cannot plausibly bind succeeding
generations, how do subsequent generations join the compact?54
(Hypothetical contractarians like John Rawls and Immanuel Kant face
no such difficulties, of course.55) The role advanced by some theorists
for exit in answering this question is the proposition that the failure to
exit from a political order "counts," in some relevant sense, as assent
to government, which in turn legitimates that government.
The locus classicus of this argument is widely supposed to be John
Locke's Second Treatise. The most famous passage on this point reads
as follows:
[E]very Man, that hath any Possession, or Enjoyment, of any part of the
Dominions of any Government, doth t ereby give his tacit Consent, and is as far
forth obliged to Obedience to the Laws of that Government, during such
Enjoyment, as any one under it; whether this his Possession be of Land, to him
and his Heirs for ever, or a Lodging only for a Week; or whether it be barely
52. Id. at 226-27.
53. Schachar, supra note 22, at 79-80.
54. See, e.g., DAVID HUME, Of the Original Contract, in ESSAYS, LITERARY,
MORAL, AND POLITICAL 270, 273 (Ward, Lock, & Co. 1875) (1770) (noting that social
contract theory "supposes the consent of the fathers to bind the children (which
republican writers will never allow)").
55. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 16 (2001); IMMANUEL
KANT, On the Proverb: That May Be True in Theory, But Is of No Practical Use, in
PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS 77-78 (Hackett 1983) (1793).
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travelling freely on the Highway; and in Effect, it reaches as far as the very being
of any one within the Territories of that Government.56
This excerpt is customarily quoted in support of what I will call a
caricature of Locke's position: that failure to exit "counts," in some
sense, as a binding assent to the social contract.5 7 But Locke is much
subtler on this point than many accounts give him credit for, and this
caricature is not his position at all. Locke does not claim that the use
or enjoyment of property is enough to make the person a party to the
social contract and thus a subject or member of the Commonwealth;
indeed, "[n]othing can make any Man so, but his actually entering into
it by positive Engagement, and express Promise and Compact."58 For
Locke, once that kind of express assent is given, the subject is
"perpetually and indispensably obliged to be and remain unalterably a
Subject."5 9 By contrast, the enjoyment of property grounds only a kind
of temporary or provisional second-class citizenship: "only a local
Protection and Homage," which applies "only as he dwells upon, and
enjoys [the property]," creating a relationship that is much like that
between a person and "[a] Family [with which] he found it convenient
to abide for some time; though, while he continued in it, he were obliged
to comply with the Laws, and submit to the Government he found
there."60 And Locke indicates that this temporary or provisional
second-class membership, unlike full membership, comes with an
implicit exit right: "whenever the Owner [of land], who has given
nothing but such a tacit Consent to the Government, will, by Donation,
Sale, or otherwise, quit the said Possession, he is at liberty to go and
incorporate himself into any other Commonwealth, or to agree with
others to being a new one, in vacuis locis."61 So, for Locke, exit rights
are the preserve of the less-than-citizen-something like a resident
alien-and a refusal to exit amounts only to consent, in a genuine if
rather austere sense, to taking the order as one finds it, for as long as
one happens to be there. Consent with promise creates citizenship,
which is permanent; consent without promise grounds only a
provisional kind of submission to the claims of the political order.
56. LOCKE, supra note 46, at 392. See also id. at 393 ("Whoever ... by
Inheritance, Purchase, Permission, or otherways enjoys any part of the Land, so annext
to, and under the Government of that Commonwealth, must take it with the Condition it
is under; that is, of submitting to the Government of the Commonwealth, under whose
Jurisdiction it is, as far forth, as any Subject of it.").
57. See, e.g., A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS
83-85 (1979); Karen Johnson, Political Obligation and the Voluntary Association Model
of the State, 86 ETHICS 17, 22 (1975).
58. LOCKE, supra note 46, at 394.
59. Id.




This careful and intriguing account, however, seems to have
attracted less attention than the caricature-a caricature that looks an
awful lot like Jean-Jacques Rousseau's characteristically terser, less
careful, and more vigorous account of the relationship between consent
and residence:
If ... at the time of the social compact, there are opponents to it, their opposition
does not invalidate the contract; it merely prevents them from being included in
it. They are foreigners among citizens. Once the state is instituted, residence
implies consent. To inhabit the territory is to submit to sovereignty.62
Unfortunately, it was this caricature that framed subsequent
discussion in this tradition: David Hume's critical essay Of the Original
Contract led the way in attacking the simplistic dictum that residence
implies a promise of obedience, and even some modern scholars seem
to have unfairly ascribed the view to Locke.63 Hume himself has
generally been regarded as having soundly unhorsed the caricature,
ridiculing the notion "that, by living under the dominion of a prince,
which one might leave, every individual has given a tacit consent to his
authority, and promised him obedience," he pointed out that no one in
fact takes the view "that the matter depends on his choice," and
moreover that no one is meaningfully free to leave "when he knows no
foreign language or manners, and lives from day to day, by the small
wages which he acquires."64
Among the contemporary contractarians, Harry Beran has offered
a noteworthy effort that takes exit seriously, and which attempts to
respond to Hume, in The Consent Theory of Political Obligation.65
Taking him as a suitable example of the modern consent theorists, I
will try to summarize the structure of his argument. First, consent to
government is equivalent to a promise to obey.66 Second, promise has
a pre-political normativity, specifically, "promises create (institutional
or self-assumed) obligations and rights,"67 so long as the promise is
made to other persons.6 8 Third, once citizens reach majority,
voluntarily consenting to accept membership in the state amounts to
assuming a current and future promissory obligation to obey the state
62. JEAN-JACQUEs ROUSSEAU, On the Social Contract, in JEAN-JACQUES
ROUSSEAU, THE BASIC POLITICAL WRITINGS 227 (Hackett 2011) (1762) (emphasis added).
63. See, e.g., SIMMONS, supra note 57, at 83-85; Johnson, supra note 57, at 22.
64. HUME, supra note 54, at 276.
65. See HARRY BERAN, THE CONSENT THEORY OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION 1-4
(1987).
66. Id. at 30.
67. Id. at 23. The institution of promise is, for Beran, grounded somehow in the
right of personal self-determination. See id. at 27; see also id. at 52 ("My position assumes
the existence of natural as well as self-assumed obligations . . .
68. See id. at 46-49.
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and its current and future governments and laws,69 so long as certain
basic conditions amenable to the creation of a promissory obligation
are met, including voluntariness, which can be promoted with the
introduction of an exit right.7 0 Thus, much like Rousseau, he argues
that "continued residence in the state, when [persons] cease to be
political minors and assume full political rights, counts as . . . tacit
consent."7 1 Fourth, despite the promissory, executory nature of the
political obligation assumed by a consenting person, "it must be open
to citizens, except under certain conditions, to abandon their
membership of a particular state and, therefore, their political
obligation to it." 72
There are several deep difficulties with Beran's account. We may
lose him at the first step (i.e., the equivalence of consent and promise),
if we accord with everyday usage in thinking that consent and promise
are different in important respects, and that, whatever the moral
consequences of an actual promise to obey the state might be, simple
consent does not amount to or "count as" such a promise.73 We may lose
him at the second step (i.e., the reliance upon a purportedly pre-
political institution of promise) if we are inclined to join Hume in
rejecting the idea that promise has some kind of pre-political
normativity-"I say, you find yourself embarrassed, when it is asked,
why are we bound to keep our word?"74 -or if we do not accept Beran's
version of it, including his particular account of the conditions under
which acts give rise to promissory obligations. And we may lose him in
the difficult interaction between the third and fourth steps, in the
69. See, e.g., id. at 127 ("[I]n accepting membership in a state a person agrees to
comply not only with present law and the present government but also with law that will
in the future be enacted and governments that will in future be (constitutionally)
appointed.").
70. See id. at 59 (arguing that rights of emigration and secession "would go a
very long way towards making membership in the state voluntary for adults").
71. Id. at 28-29.
72. Id. at 30; see id. at 46 ("[T]he fundamental political consent is, therefore,
whether to (continue to) accept membership in this going concern.").
73. The core normative significance of the promise in everyday usage is that the
promisor assumes an executory obligation to the promisee which is to be discharged in
the future, with the scope and normativity of that obligation defined by necessary and
non-obvious details of the relevant institution of promise itself (e.g., criteria of
reciprocity, absence of duress or undue influence, capacity, absence of unconscionable
terms, absence of misrepresentation, and so on). The core normative significance of
consent is that the consentor presently acquiesces in or permits some act of another,
waiving or declining to exercise a power to preclude or prohibit the act in question. But
consent, without more, does not ordinarily imply executory obligations, and consent
ordinarily can be withdrawn at any time unless the consentor has made an express or
implied promise not to do so. Indeed, the essence of promise is the giving of the power to
make a claim upon my future behavior regardless of whether I consent at that time. As
we shall see below, this distinction is enormously significant for the analysis of
legitimacy. See infra Section III.B.
74. HUME, supra note 54, at 280.
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peculiar tension between the citizen's assumption of a promissory,
prospective obligation at the time of contracting and Beran's
simultaneous insistence on a right to leave during the term of that
obligation.
This tension can be seen starkly when Beran argues that exit
should not be allowed when the state has imposed a penalty, or when
the citizen has come under a "special obligation," of some kind, and the
citizen wants to leave rather than pay the penalty or discharge the
obligation.7 5 In that situation-when the tension between consent and
promise is perfectly clear, as there is plainly no current consent to
remaining in the state as a subject of its laws, but only the fact of an
earlier promise-Beran holds that the citizen "is under a self-assumed
obligation to accept the penalty."76 So on Beran's view, subsequent
revocation of consent does not extinguish our promissory obligations if
the state takes the view that there is something still for us to do. By
now, of course, the position has ended up looking rather a lot like
Rousseau's caricature: if you have once been an adult resident, there is
no exit right unless and until the state takes the view that you owe it
nothing further; your earlier consent, inferred from your earlier
presence, creates a current obligation to obey, notwithstanding the fact
that you do not actually and currently consent to anything. Promise,
not consent, is doing all the heavy lifting here.
I have focused on Beran because his view is particularly detailed
and because he is particularly attentive to exit rights, but a number of
other thoughtful accounts might just as well have been chosen. The
Rousseauian identification of consent with promise or contract, in
particular, which purportedly grounds a consent-based claim on an
individual who does not in fact here and now consent, is widely
shared.7 7
To sum up, contractarian theorists have recognized that there is
an important relationship between exit rights and legitimacy, but,
from Rousseau (not Locke!) onward, they seem committed to an
unconvincing jump from consent to promise, which leads to
unsatisfactory analytical tangles. Locke's nuanced intimation that a
provisional but genuine consent without promise might, at least in
some cases, play an important role seems to have sat more or less
where he left it. We will return to that view below.
75. Beran shares this position with a great many other writers. See infra Section
IV.D.
76. BERAN, supra note 65, at 112.
77. See, e.g., JOSEPH TuSSMAN, OBLIGATION AND THE BODY POLITIC 7-10 (1960);
SIMMONS, supra note 57, at 76-77.
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3. International Legal Scholarship
Exit and withdrawal have received a great deal of attention from
international lawyers. For many decades, scholars have conducted
close analyses of particular orders and institutions to determine
whether exit would be "lawful" under applicable rules of international
law. In this vein, a body of careful scholarship has developed regarding
the legality of exit from particular institutions (such as the United
Nations and the pre-Lisbon European Union),78 exploring the scope
and structure of exit rights from treaties,7 9 and applying the insights
of positive political theory to illuminate the impact of exit rights on
behavior.80 One (superb) recent contribution has triggered a literature
on rights of withdrawal from customary international law.8 1 But the
normative analysis of exit rights-and the relationship between exit
and legitimacy in particular-has been neglected.
This neglect may be less than completely surprising for a number
of reasons. First, given that so many of the analytical tools of political
theory are forged at the level of the nation-state, the notion that exit
78. See, e.g., Hannes Hofmeister, Should I Stay or Should I Go? - A Critical
Analysis of the Right to Withdraw from the EU, 16 EUR. L.J. 589, 602-03 (2010); Dovydas
Vitkauskas, Can a Member Secede from the United Nations?, 3 INT'L J. BALTIC L. 47
(2007); K. Magliveras, Withdrawal from the League of Nations Revisited, 10 DICKINSON
J. INT'LL. 25, 25-26 (1991); John A. Hill, The European Economic Community: The Right
of Member State Withdrawal, 12 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 335, 335-37 (1982); Michael
Akehurst, Withdrawal from International Organisations, 32 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS.
143, 143-45 (1979); Nathan Feinberg, Unilateral Withdrawal from an International
Organization, 39 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 189, 218 (1964); P.J.N.B., Termination of
Membership of the League of Nations, 16 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 153 (1935); Athanassiou,
supra note 37, at 5-8.
79. See, e.g., Gino J. Naldi & Konstantinos D. Maglivera, Human Rights and The
Denunciation of Treaties and Withdrawal from International Organisations, 33 POLISH
Y.B. INT'L L. 95, 96 (2013); Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579,
1585 (2005); Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2061, 2065-66 (2003);
Kelvin Widdows, The Denunciation of International Labour Conventions, 33 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 1052, 1052 (1984); Kelvin Widdows, The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties
Containing No Denunciation Clause, 53 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 83 (1982).
80. See, e.g., Anna T. Katselas, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 93 NEB. L. REV. 313, 348 (2014); Phedon Nicolaides, Withdrawal from the
European Union: A Typology of Effects, 20 MAASTRICHT J. 209 (2013); Susanne Lechner
& Renate Ohr, The Right of Withdrawal in the Treaty of Lisbon: A Game-Theoretic
Reflection on Different Decision Processes in the EU, 32 EUR. J. LAW & ECON. 357, 358
(2011); Jonathan Slapin, Exit, Voice, and Cooperation: Bargaining Power in
International Organizations and Federal Systems, 21 J. THEORETICAL POL. 187, 189
(2009).
81. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 38, at 205. See also, e.g., Rachel Brewster,
Withdrawing from Custom: Choosing Between Default Rules, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 47 (2010); Samuel Estreicher, A Post-Formation Right of Withdrawal from Customary
International Law: Some Cautionary Notes, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 57 (2010);




and legitimacy can be related in an important way may have suffered
from Hume's emphatic declaration that one can seldom be said to be
truly free to exit from a political order.82 Second, it may form part of
what some scholars describe as a general neglect of normative theory
in international law. For example, Allen Buchanan commented in 2004
that "little has been done to connect positive theory with moral theory"
in international law and, specifically, that much of the existing work
"suffers from a lack of an institutional focus."8 3 Thomas Franck
likewise complained not so long ago that "[a]ny contemporary
philosophy of international normativity . .. tends to appear in print as,
at most, the scraggly tail on elegant, fully developed theories intended
to explain the dynamics of national legal phenomena."84 Third, the
notion that international law makes direct moral claims upon states
does not sit well with either most realist accounts (which see state
interest as the dominant source of normativity in the international
sphere) or most liberal accounts (which look "through" the state to the
persons and interest groups beneath). Fourth, and finally, there may
be something especially unwelcome about the topic of exit to the extent
that it involves the abrogation or renunciation of norms of
international law. Laurence Helfer puts it succinctly:
To a profession anxious to prove that nations obey international legal
obligations, a state's right to unilaterally abrogate its treaty obligations-often
without substantive restraint or meaningful sanction-is not something to be
advertised. In fact, major public international law treatises (and even most
specialized studies of treaty law and practice) all but ignore exit or give the issue
only passing attention.85
Exit aside, there is a rich literature on the legitimacy of
international institutions. Some scholars-most prominently Thomas
Franck, Allen Buchanan, and Mattias Kumm-have advanced theories
of legitimacy to be applied to international law as such,86 while others
have focused on specific categories of orders and institutions.8 7 And
nowhere is this literature more developed than in the rich discourse
surrounding the legitimacy of the European Union, with regard to
which accounts have been advanced for input legitimacy, output
82. See BERAN, supra note 65 and accompanying text.
83. ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION:
MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (2004) (emphasis omitted).
84. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 8 (1990)
(emphasis in original). See also, e.g., Bodansky, supra note 39, at 596 (noting that "the
legitimacy of international governance has, until recently, received little attention").
85. Helfer, supra note 79, at 1592.
86. See, e.g., Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A
Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 907, 908 (2004); FRANCK,
supra note 84, at 20; BUCHANAN, supra note 83, at 404.
87. See, e.g., Nienke Grossman, Legitimacy and International Adjudicative
Bodies, 41 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 107 (2009); Bodansky, supra note 39, at 596.
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legitimacy, mission legitimacy, functional legitimacy, delegated
legitimacy, and so on.88 But these accounts typically ignore or neglect
exit. So our problem remains.
Thus, our inquiry falls squarely in an area where international
lawyers appear to have been particularly, if oddly, reluctant to tread.
4. Secession and Self-Determination
The topic of secession and the related one of self-determination of
peoples have, between them, spawned a considerable literature,
including much deeply normative scholarship.89 Secession is clearly a
form of exit from a political order: when a governed entity secedes, it
ceases to be within the normative sphere of a political order. But
secession involves much more than "just" exit: it involves the taking of
a portion of that order's territorial, institutional, and human fabric to
create a new political entity-a plurality where formerly there was a
unity in the relevant sense. As a result, I join the views of those who
see secession as a deeply special case raising peculiar complexities and
problems.9 0 Accordingly, I will bracket the issue of secession for
subsequent analysis: I will make no effort to address it, as such, in this
88. See, e.g., TURKULER ISIKSEL, EUROPE's FUNCTIONAL CONSTITUTION: A
THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE STATE (2016) ("functional" legitimacy);
Grdinne de Bdrca, Europe's Raison d'Etre, in THE EUROPEAN UNION'S SHAPING OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 31-33 (Dimitry Kochenov & Fabian Amtenbrink eds.,
2013) (mission legitimacy); PETER L. LINDSETH, POWER AND LEGITIMACY: RECONCILING
EUROPE AND THE NATION-STATE (2010) (delegated legitimacy); FRITZ W. SCHARPF,
GOVERNING IN EUROPE: EFFECTIVE AND DEMOCRATIC? 6-28 (1999) (input and output
legitimacy).
89. See, e.g., SECESSION AND SELF-DETERMINATION (S. Macedo & A. Buchanan
eds., 2003); HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 473-76 (1996); ALLEN BUCHANAN,
SECESSION: THE MORALITY OF POLITICAL DIVORCE FROM FORT SUMTER TO LITHUANIA
AND QUEBEC 1-25 (1991); LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-
DETERMINATION (1978); Lawrence M. Anderson, The Institutional Basis of Secessionist
Politics: Federalism and Secession in the United States, 34 PUBLIUS 1, 1-2 (2004); Daniel
Weinstock, Constitutionalizing the Right to Secede, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 182, 202-03 (2001);
W. Norman, The Ethics of Secession as The Regulation of Secessionist Politics, in
NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION 34, 34-43 (M. Moore ed., 1998);
Christopher Wellman, A Defense of Secession and Political Self-Determination, 24 PHIL.
& PUB. AFFAIRS 142, 142-43 (1995); D. Gauthier, Breaking Up: An Essay on Secession,
24 CAN. J. PHIL. 357, 358 (1994); Michael Hechter, The Dynamics of Secession, 35 ACTA
SOCIOLOGICA 280, 280 (1992); J. Buchanan & R. Faith, Secession and the Limits of
Taxation: Toward a Theory of Internal Exit, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 1023, 1024 (1987)
[hereinafter Buchanan, Theory]; Anthony H. Birch, Another Liberal Theory of Secession,
32 POL. STUD. 596, 596-97 (1984); Beran, supra note 19, at 21-23.
90. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 633, 651 n.88 (1991) (noting the special considerations that generate "asymmetry
between two seemingly parallel rights, that of emigration and that of secession");








This Article's central claim is very simple: the protection of exit
rights makes a distinctive contribution to the legitimacy of an order or
institution. I call this contribution "exit legitimacy."9 1 The better the
protection offered by an order or institution, the better its claim to exit
legitimacy.92 While the focus here is on the exit legitimacy of
international institutions, the idea is, of course, of much broader
application.
This Section will clarify some of the elements of this claim-
including what I mean by "exit," "rights," and "legitimacy"-before
offering two versions or accounts of the normative appeal of my
position, which I call the "thin" and "thick" accounts of exit legitimacy.
On the thin account, exit rights are normatively significant because
they operationalize consent, and the normative power of consent is
taken for granted. On the thick account, exit rights are normatively
significant because they instantiate political autonomy. This Section
will conclude with some reasons to think exit legitimacy is particularly
suitable for the international sphere.
1. "Exit"
By "exit" I centrally mean the voluntary and complete
renunciation of a role or status that bears rights and obligations within
an order or institution.93 To give three natural examples, consider (1)
the exit of natural persons from a nation-state or other jurisdictional
unit, (2) the exit of states from a federation (recognizing that this, as a
form of secession, involves many additional complications that will not
be considered here), and (3) the exit of states from an international
institution (or other international legal order, such as customary
international law or a treaty). This Article's primary focus will be on
91. I find that I am preceded in my use of this phrase by Santiago Montt, who
states briefly and without elaboration that under appropriate circumstances exit "may
serve as a proper source of legitimacy" in his work on bilateral investment treaties, but
offers no theoretical support, nor any evaluation or explanation, of the idea. SANTIAGO
MONTI, STATE LIABILITY IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: GLOBAL
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAw IN THE BIT GENERATION 145-46 (2012).
92. Accordingly, the availability of exit legitimacy is a matter of degree, not a
matter of binary absolutes. I am grateful to Turkuler Isiskel for suggesting that I make
this point explicit.
93. I thus set strictly involuntary exit aside here. But see infra Section IV.D.
(discussing exile and banishment as forms of ex post exit option).
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the third of these examples: the exit of states from international
institutions. Importantly, while many exit rights in practice require
physical movement or alterations in the material world-such as
physical movement out of a state territory by an emigrating person-
it is exit from membership, not from a physical space, that is central to
my meaning.
Moreover, while complete exit is my primary focus, the concept of
exit legitimacy has some application, mutatis mutandis, to temporary
and partial exit. Temporary exit is self-explanatory; partial exit may
be possible in an order or institution that recognizes different forms or
categories of membership (each with its own set of rights and
obligations) and allows exit from one form of membership to another.
For example, international institutions commonly differentiate
between full members and associate or observer members, with the
latter given a thinner set of rights and obligations; this raises the
prospect that one could choose to undertake partial exit from the status
of full member to the status of associate member. 94 Likewise, national
orders commonly differentiate, for example, between citizens, resident
aliens, short-term visitors, and persons unlawfully present. Partial exit
in my sense is the renunciation of one membership status (e.g., "full
member" or "citizen") and the acceptance of another within the same
order or institution (e.g., "associate member" or "resident alien"9 5).
Something like partial exit may also be at work when one jurisdiction
allows domestic corporations to reincorporate in another jurisdiction
but continue to do business in the original one as a nonresident.96
Obviously, temporary and partial exit raise some interesting
implications for exit legitimacy, but we will leave those implications for
another day and focus here on our core case.
What I call here "partial exit" should not be confused with what
Joseph Weiler calls "selective" exit, which occurs when a governed
entity, "while retaining membership, seeks to avoid the fulfilment of
unpalatable obligations by simply disregarding them."97 Exit in my
sense is always the renunciation of some type of membership, including
the corresponding rights and obligations, not the violation of those
94. See, e.g., LUISA BLANCHFIELD & MAJORIE BROWN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R43614, MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS SPECIALIZED AGENCIES (2014).
95. The idea that a citizen might be allowed to partially exit into the status of a
resident alien might be thought fanciful, but Michael Walzer has suggested that "we
must at least consider the possibility that [native born citizens] be allowed . .. to become
resident aliens at home, acknowledging their obligation to defend society against
destruction, but refusing to defend or aggrandize the state." MICHAEL WALZER,
OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS ON DISOBEDIENCE, WAR, AND CITIZENSHIP 112-13 (1970)
(emphasis in original).
96. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 24, at 152.
97. Joseph H. H. Weiler, Alternatives to Withdrawal from an International




obligations. Continuing to hold a status that makes one subject to an
obligation, while disregarding or violating that obligation, is not "exit"
on this account at all.98
2. "Rights"
Without getting anywhere near the complex definitional and
taxonomic questions that swim into view when contemplating the word
"rights," I want to state clearly that when I refer to a right of exit I
mean minimally the legal entitlement to engage in what I am calling
exit. In doing so, I recognize that a bare legal entitlement seldom
amounts to much in isolation: it can be granted on such conditions that
it is not much of a right at all (e.g., a right of access to the courts on the
condition that you first capture a live unicorn-or even a live tiger-is
not much of a right of access to the courts). Moreover, the right of exit,
like a great many rights, requires a certain endowment of resources to
use (e.g., the right of access to the courts is not much use without some
combination of time, energy, money, and assistance of counsel
sufficient to permit meaningful use of the judicial system). Thus, my
definition of an exit right includes the specification of conditions for the
exercise of that right, and the minimum endowment of necessary
resources, that make it a realistic or genuine option. And just as when
we talk about a right of access to courts we implicitly mean to exclude
the unicorn and tiger examples, and just as we usually regard a system
that does not offer some form of legal aid or public defense as offering
less of a right of access to courts than one that does, so I intend to be
understood here.9 9 The presence or absence of an exit right is no more
a crudely binary matter than is the presence or absence of legitimacy:
the more realistic or genuine the exit option, the better the claim to
exit legitimacy.
98. Likewise, the invocation of purported reservations to the jurisdiction of an
international institution do not, I think, constitute exit on my account. Governed entities
routinely disagree with one another and with organs of governance about the scope and
content of the obligations appurtenant to membership in a legal order, including the
limits of those obligations and of the jurisdiction of the order in question. Denial of
jurisdiction in a particular case or category of cases need not involve either the assertion
or the exercise of a right of exit in the sense with which I am here concerned. I am
grateful to Julian Arato for putting this issue to me, and for highlighting the Loizidou
case in which Turkey pressed objections to the jurisdiction of the European Court of
Human Rights based on a purported territorial reservation to the jurisdiction of that
court. See Julian Arato, Treaty Interpretation and Constitutional Transformation:
Informal Change in International Organizations, 38 YALE J. INT'L L. 288, 338-43 (2013).
99. Compare, e.g., JEFF SPINNER-HALEV, SURVIVING DIVERSITY: RELIGION AND
DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP (2000) 77-78 (arguing, among other things, for an "exit fund"
in certain circumstances to make exit realistically possible).
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3. "Legitimacy"
It is especially important to be clear about what I mean by
"legitimacy," as my meaning may be thought a little idiosyncratic. In
the account I offer here, the project of legitimacy is the offering of
reasons to governed entities within an order or institution to accept
and comply with the relevant order or institution and its outputs. 100
Such reasons are appeals to the capacity of governed agents to choose
voluntarily to accept or comply; they are no more than that.
Importantly, unlike many theories of legitimacy, mine includes no
account of objective sufficiency, or adequacy in the abstract, that is, of
a threshold that, once reached, marks the order as having crossed a
line that makes it "legitimate."o10 The weight given to exit legitimacy
as a reason for acceptance or compliance is entirely a matter for the
governed entities to whom the case is made, and, in my view, there is
no sensible way to prescribe from outside what should be "enough."
Furthermore, whether the agent "ought," here and now and all things
considered, to actually accept or comply with the political order or its
outputs is another question entirely, one with which I am wholly
unconcerned. My claim is that the presence of exit rights offers a
reason-not necessarily the best reason, an overriding reason, or even
a particularly good reason in every circumstance-for accepting or
complying with the order in question and its outputs.
Thus, rather than speaking in terms of a binary distinction
between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" orders, I will speak in terms of
legitimating resources. The better the resources, the better the case
that can be made to the governed for acceptance and compliance. And,
in that light, the issue here is whether exit rights might make a
contribution, that is, furnish additional resources for making such
100. My use of the term "acceptance" here does not imply abandonment of projects
of reform. An entity to whom a legitimacy claim is addressed may, on reflection, regard
the relevant political order as meeting a standard of acceptability but regard some
change-perhaps profound change-as desirable or necessary, and pursue reform
accordingly. More generally, acceptance and compliance are distinct: it is possible to
comply with something without accepting that it makes a moral claim (as in the case of
compliance that arises solely from fear of consequences or pursuit of benefits). Similarly,
it is possible to accept something as normative without complying, as Chesterton notes:
'Thieves respect property. They merely wish the property to become their property that
they may more perfectly respect it." G.K. CHESTERTON, THE MAN WHO WAS THURSDAY:
A NIGHTMARE 47 (1935).
101. Compare, e.g., BUCHANAN, supra note 83, at 237 (A wielder of political power
(the supremacist making, application, and enforcement of laws in a territory) is
legitimate (i.e., is morally justified in wielding political power) if and only if it (1) does a
credible job of protecting at least the most basic human rights of all those over whom it
wields power and (2) provides this protection through processes, policies, and actions
that themselves respect the most basic human rights.).
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cases.10 2 To borrow the apt language of Joseph Tussman in another
context, I aim to move legitimacy discussions "from the assertive to the
claiming mood."103
Relatedly, I make no claim here about he interaction between and
among reasons, and no claim about the extent to which it is desirable
to pursue exit legitimacy in institutional design rather than, or at the
cost of, other types of legitimacy (or even other things that have
nothing to do with legitimacy) when there is a conflict. We may in
principle decide to limit and restrict exit rights in order to achieve
other things that we think valuable-just as we may decide to restrict,
for example, democratic involvement in government to achieve other
things that we think valuable. (Lest I be thought unduly faint-hearted
for declining to single-mindedly insist on exit rights in all
circumstances, consider a genuinely hard case: the ius cogens
peremptory norms of international custom.)104 My argument here is
simply that something profoundly important is lost when we restrict
exit, and that, in most cases, we can achieve our collective aims without
restricting exit. 05
B. The "Thin"Account
On the thin account, exit rights are significant because they
"operationalize" the consent of governed entities. By this slightly
ungainly verb I mean that they provide an institutional mechanism
that makes consent more normatively salient in practice: consent is
more genuine, more ascertainable, and more closely related to the
relevant act (or relationship) of governance. Crucially, exit rights
provide a direct and legitimating connection between consent and
governance that does not rely on promise or contract.
This account takes as its starting point the traditional-though
not uncontroversial'06-consensus that state consent is the
foundational source of the normativity of international law, and of the
102. For an interesting account of the rational advantages of the use of moral
reasons to coordinate support for political institutions, see Allen Buchanan & Robert
Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions, 20 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 405,
410 (2006).
103. TUSSMAN, supra note 77, at 78.
104. Even Bradley and Gulati, in their brilliant and provocative attack on the
"mandatory view" of customary international law, take the view that rules like "jus
cogens norms of human rights" may be "prime candidates" for a mandatory approach.
Bradley & Gulati, supra note 38, at 273. Single-currency arrangements also present a
deeply difficult case for exit rights. See, e.g., Athanassiou, supra note 37, at 40-41.
105. See infra Sections IV.C., IV.D.
106. See, e.g., Nico Krisch, The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of
Global Public Goods, 108 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (2014).
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normative legitimacy of its institutions.107 And while its focus is the
international sphere, consent has of course been the preeminent source
of legitimacy for national orders in liberal theory for centuries.10 8
Exit rights make consent more genuine by increasing the extent
to which states make a real choice to bear the rights and obligations of
an order or institution and to be bound by it and by its outputs. John
Simmons has articulated the central point that, in order for consent to
be politically salient, it is necessary to point to a "clearly presented
choice situation";1 09 exit rights create exactly such a situation by
granting governed entities the power to disclaim the role on which
their institutional obligations are contingent. And it is clear that a
choice to remain is at least more genuine with an exit right than
without one.110
Exit rights also make consent more ascertainable. Consent
theorists are frequently bedeviled by problems of determining whether
and when states have consented to particular elements of an order or
institution, including changes in the rules of an international
institution or specific putative norms of customary international law.
A standard example is the issue of "subsequent practice": if the
operation of an institution in practice diverges from the terms to which
the state members initially agreed, it is not obvious what should "count
as" consent to the new terms.' But the ability to withdraw from the
institution means that remaining in the institution has much more
meaning as a manifestation of consent-as a real choice to bear the
107. See, e.g., Duncan B. Hollis, Why State Consent Still Matters-Non-State
Actors, Treaties, and the Changing Sources of International Law, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L
L. 137, 141 n.14 (2005) (quoting Louis Henkin, General Course on Public International
Law, in IV RECUEiL DES COuRS 46 (1989)) ("State consent is the foundation of
international law."); Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 102, at 412; BUCHANAN, supra
note 83, at 302; Helfer, supra note 79, at 1593 n.33; Bodansky, supra note 39, at 597. See
also, e.g., S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 18 (Sept. 7)
("The rules of law binding upon States ... emanate from their own free will.").
108. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 484 (Cambridge 1996) (1651) ("[T]he
point of time, wherein a man becomes subject of a Conquerour, is that point, wherein
having liberty to submit to him, he consenteth, either by expresse words, or by other
sufficient sign, to be his Subject."); SIMMONS, supra note 57, at 57 ("Consent theory has
provided us with a more intuitively appealing account of political obligation than any
other tradition in modern political theory."); HUME, supra note 54, at 275 (acknowledging
that consent of the people "is surely the best and most sacred" basis of government);
LOCKE, supra note 46, at 374 ("[N]o one can be ... subjected to the Political Power of
another, without his own Consent.") (emphasis in original).
109. SIMMONS, supra note 57, at 95 (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. See, e.g., Frederick G. Whelan, Citizenship and the Right to Leave, 75 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 636, 639 (1981); BERAN, supra note 65, at 112.
111. See, e.g., Christopher Peters, Subsequent Practice and Established Practice
of International Organizations: Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 3 GOTTINGEN J. INTL L.
617 (2011); Bodansky, supra note 39, at 606 (reporting a criticism of the International
Whaling Convention that states "signed on to play cricket, but now find themselves
pressured to play a game of chess instead").
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status of membership with its appurtenant obligations-than it would
have in the absence of such rights. Another prominent example is the
difficult case of "invalid reservations": the problem presented when
purported reservations to accession to a treaty or an institution are
later determined to be impermissible. Here, also, exit rights help to
ascertain whether the state has consented to accession without the
reservations. 112
The point can be illustrated with one of David Hume's images. In
Of the Original Contract Hume writes that "[w]e may as well assert,
that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion
of the master; though he was carried on board while asleep, and must
leap into the ocean, and perish, the moment he leaves her."1 13 This is
true enough, on its own terms: if there is no real way to exit, it is hard
to read much into staying onboard. And that is certainly Hume's point.
But my point is that, if the vessel were moored in home port, with the
doors opened wide and the sailor free to leave and go home (and his
right to do so proclaimed and displayed), and the sailor remained
onboard anyway, then we would have much firmer grounds to suppose
that he consented to be there. Consent, in other words, would be more
readily ascertainable from his behavior. Exit rights move us from the
ship at sea to something closer to the ship in dock.
Finally, and most importantly, exit rights make consent more
closely related to the act or relation of governance whose legitimacy is
in question, and, in so doing, they help to relieve the unease around
the contractarian idea that earlier agreement or promise creates a pre-
political ground for the normativity of later acts and relations of
governance. Consider the core of the standard contractarian account of
obligation: a state has a political obligation here and now because it
assumed it by agreement in the past. But, a basic difficulty for pre-
political accounts of contract and promise is that the relevant act of
consent in the past may be removed-perhaps far removed-in time,
object, and sometimes even identity of the subject, from the situation
of governance here and now. Specifically, the relevant act of consent
may have been given a long time ago, may have been given to
something that looks quite unlike the governance situation or
institution that is actually at hand here and now, and may have been
given by a state that looks very much unlike the state that is currently
being governed here and now. If the state does not consent here and
now to the situation of governance, and if consent is the dominant
principle of normativity, it is not obvious why the absence of consent
112. See Helfer, supra note 79, at 1642-43 (noting that exit rights help to solve
this problem). A real-world example seems to have taken place involving the First
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See
Timothy Meyer, Power, Exit Costs, and Renegotiation in International Law, 51 HARv.
INTL L. J. 379, 398 (2010) (discussing Trinidad & Tobago's withdrawal from the Protocol
and its unsuccessful attempt to re-accede with reservations).
113. HUME, supra note 54, at 276.
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here and now should give way to the fact that another entity gave
consent at a time that is not now, to something that was not this.
Promise theories can leave us a long way from consent when we need
it most.
A basic problem here-as Hume pointed out two hundred years
ago-is that, however much we might recognize the value of consent,
the pre-political normativity of the institution of promise is not at all
obvious.114 Many of the key early modern theorists typically resolved
this problem by invoking divine will as the ultimate source of the claim
of a promise upon promisors,11 5 but we might think this argument
unavailable today, at least within the liberal tradition. The reliance on
earlier promise to infuse governance here and now with the
legitimating tincture of consent, even if actual consent is entirely
lacking here and now, continues to beg the question.
But exit rights lift some of the burden from the shoulders of
promise by closing the gap between consent and governance. In the
presence of exit rights, an entity governed by an international
institution consents to governance at the very moment of governance
itself: consent theory no longer looks to the past but looks to the
present. The governed entity also consents to governance by the
institution as it then stands, not as it was contemplated by the
(perhaps vague and ambiguous) text of an originating treaty. And the
entity doing the consenting is not a distant forbear of the governed
entity, connected only by the fiction of the continuing identity of states:
it is the very same combination of state, government, and persons that
is now subject to governance. In other words, it is consent here and
now, not antecedent promise, that does the work, and we need not
invoke a pre-political institution of dubious appeal to tap into the
legitimating normative power of consent.16 The resonance with
Locke's "tacit consent"-a provisional, legitimating consent-without-
promise, rooted in the free choice to presently hold a role to which
rights and obligations pertain-should be now be quite clear.117
The appeal and plausibility of consent as a source of normativity
when "operationalized" by an ongoing exit right is perfectly illustrated
by the account given by Socrates in Plato's Crito. Entreated by his
114. Id. at 279-80.
115. For example, I think it is fair to characterize Grotius' view of the normativity
of contract in this way. While human persons are naturally inclined to seek a well-
regulated communal life-from which follow the universally beneficial principles of
natural right, including "the fulfilling of Covenants"-the obligatory force of the duty to
do so is grounded in the fact that God clearly wills us to follow this inclination, as "it was
his Pleasure that these Principles should be in us." HUGO GROTrUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR
AND PEACE 89-93 (Liberty Press 2005) (1625). See also id. at 147-48 (indicating that
reasonable counsels do not of themselves have obligatory force).
116. See, e.g., Hollis, supra note 107, at 171 (noting that "states prefer to rely not
only on the original grant of authority to an extra-national actor but also seek to
establish contemporaneous consent to the exercise of that authority").
117. See supra subsection II.B.2 (discussion social contract theory).
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friend to escape before his execution, Socrates responds by giving voice
to the spirit of the Athenian laws:
We, the laws, have bestowed many benefits upon you. Even so, by giving every
Athenian the opportunity, once arrived at voting age and having observed the
affairs of the city and us the laws, we proclaim that if we do not please him, he
can take his possessions and go wherever he pleases. Not one of our laws raises
any obstacle or forbids him, if he is not satisfied with us or the city, if one of you
wants to go and live in a colony or wants to go anywhere else, and keep his
property. We say, however, that whoever of you remains, when he sees how we
conduct our trials and manage the city in other ways, has in fact come to an
agreement with us to obey our instructions.... [A]t your trial you could have
assessed your penalty at exile if you wished, and you are now attempting to do
against the city's wishes what you could then have done with her
consent.... [Y]ou act like the meanest type of slave by trying to run away,
contrary to your commitments and your agreement to live as a citizen under
us.118
The richness and depth of this passage is remarkable-
particularly compared to the Rousseauian quip that "residency implies
consent."11 9 Socrates' point is that he has in fact made a real choice to
live in Athens "as a citizen," and that moreover it was a sober and
informed choice, taken in full knowledge of the laws and institutions of
the Athenian state and the alternatives. Even at trial-after his
obligation to submit to judgment had "accrued" under Athenian
law 2 0-he had been offered an opportunity to exit, to accept exile,
instead of receiving the appointed punishment under Athenian law.
But again, he chose voluntarily and soberly to submit to the
normativity of the law: he consented to honor his "agreement o live as
a citizen under [the laws]. "121 That obligation, assumed voluntarily-in-
fact by Socrates (as he is, here and now), toward Athens (as it is, here
and now), is normative for Socrates, not because he is clasped by the
dead hand of a past promise but because he voluntarily acknowledges
its normativity. He will not dishonor his own choice, and the
normativity to which he has submitted, by turning from it now.
Before leaving this line of argument, I want to acknowledge the
narrow scope of the consent that I have in mind here. I take it to be
quite clear that a governed entity that chooses to remain in an order,
declining to exercise an exit right, does not thereby consent to the fact
that the political order is structured, operated, or led in any particular
way. The relevant consent pertains only to the fact of membership. It
is perfectly possible to consent to be a member of an order or institution
without at the same time consenting to any particular aspect of the
structure or operation of that order or institution. Exit rights typically
give us an up-or-down, in-or-out choice about membership, which we
118. PLATO, Crito, in PLATO: COMPLETE WORKS 45-46 (John M. Cooper ed., 1997).
119. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 62 and accompanying text.
120. See infra Section IV.D (discussing ex post exit of this kind).
121. PLATO, supra note 118, at 46 (emphasis added).
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make in light of the nature and operation of the institution and the
terms of the offer of membership that is being put to us-we have a
choice to accept or reject what we might call the "political proposition"
we are offered. But the content of the political proposition, including
the structure of the order or institution, the content of its norms, the
identity of its leaders, and so on, is wholly outside the domain of choice
created by an exit right. As such, it is not right to say of my account
that "those who have not used the exit option have implicitly agreed to
their own subordination."122 What they have consented to is holding
the role to which the relevant obligations pertain. (I prefer "consented"
to "agreed," as it better captures the fact that the significance of the act
is rooted in current acquiescence, not executory promise.)
C. The "Thick" Account
1. Political Autonomy
On the thick account, exit rights are significant because they
instantiate what I call political autonomy. Political autonomy, as I use
that phrase, is a quality of an order or institution that is satisfied to
the extent that the governed entities are-strictly and literally-free,
equal, and independent with respect to that order or institution. This
subsection does no more than sketch what this view implies and
requires, and I do not pretend to have worked out its many difficult
implications. But on the view I offer here, an order or institution, or its
outputs, stands in a position to make a moral claim on governed
entities-that is, to give those entities a well-founded reason for
compliance or acceptance that is not, itself, institutionally
contingent-to the extent that those governed entities are in a
condition of political autonomy with respect to that order or institution,
or its outputs.
Freedom, as I use the term here, means that the basis for a moral
claim upon a governed entity is its own capacity for choice. The
criterion of freedom is satisfied by an order or institution to the extent
that the status of submission to the duties and obligations of
membership is voluntary and may be renounced at any time, for any
reason or for no reason. This is obviously a very strong application of
the liberal commitment to the "freedom of self-governing choosers to
live in societies that approach as closely as possible to voluntary
schemes."12 3 It is in the tradition that William Galston identifies as the
"Enlightenment Project" (i.e., reason-valorizing and autonomy-
promoting), rather than the "Reformation Project" (i.e., difference- and
diversity-protecting), strand of liberal thought.124 Freedom in this
122. Schachar, supra note 22, at 80.
123. Beran, supra note 19, at 25.
124. Galston, supra note 18, at 525.
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account lies not in not having obligations but in the freedom to accept
and reject one's obligations for oneself-in having all claims on oneself
grounded in one's own present faculty of voluntary normative
commitment.125 It involves consent without the intermediation of
promise or contract.
But freedom does not extend to having other entities act in a
particular way.126 This fact reflects the proposition that freedom
implies no right to the participation of others in a joint endeavor;
rather, to enlist others in a common endeavor, we must appeal to their
own faculty of choice. They are-to accept the phrase that presses upon
us here-ends in themselves. Among other things, this means that
freedom does not require that others offer positive alternatives (such
as rights of entry into alternative orders and institutions),127 and that
freedom implies no right to dictate or constrain what we called above
the political proposition (i.e., the design of an order or institution and
the rights and obligations of membership). This view, with its very
strong emphasis on actual contemporaneous consent, is, of course, at
odds with many normative accounts of exit, from national and
international orders alike.'28
125. I therefore join Hobbes' famous and controversial dictum that "he is free, that
can be free when he will." HOBBES, supra note 108, at 184.
126. This has some difficult but not fatal implications. My view seems to imply
that no norm of political autonomy is offended when a governed entity is subject to an
unjust or arbitrary act of the political order (for example, if a natural person is unjustly
imprisoned by a court or if a state in a federal system is unjustly invaded and occupied
by its sister states), so long as the relevant entities continue to accept the normativity of
claim made upon them. I think it is right that my view implies such a conclusion: there
is no objective substantive norm of rightness or justice in my account of political
autonomy. If the unjustly imprisoned person, or occupied state, continues to accept the
normativity of the political order, its political autonomy is unimpaired even if it is subject
to the most extreme deprivations, including ultimately torture and death. I think this
view accords with that of Socrates in the Crito that I quoted above: even supposing that
Socrates was condemned unjustly, his acceptance of the normative claim made by the
Athenian order gives the act of unjust condemnation a moral claim upon him. That is
not to say that there is nothing wrong with the order in such a situation.
127. See, e.g., Christopher Wellman, Freedom of Movement and the Rights to
Enter and Exit, in MIGRATION IN POLITICAL THEORY: THE ETHICS OF MOVEMENT AND
MEMBERSHIP 81 (Sarah Fine & Lea Ypi eds., 2016); Whelan, supra note 110, at 638.
128. See, e.g., Anna Stilz, Is There An Unqualified Right to Leave?, in MIGRATION
IN POLITICAL THEORY: THE ETHICS OF MOVEMENT AND MEMBERSHIP, supra note 127, at
69 ("If distributive schemes of social justice can bind individuals without their consent,
then they ought to bind those individuals whether they seek to exit the state's territory
or not. If this is correct, then a legitimate state can enforce distributive obligations even
against those citizens who decide to relocate."); Feinberg, supra note 40, at 217 ("It would
seem that there is no reason to consider a treaty establishing an international
organization as one permitting withdrawal ex natura."); see also id. at 212-13
("Sovereignty is ... given full expression in the right of any State to join a particular
organization, or not. But once a State decides to enter an organization it is no longer free,
and its own wishes are no longer decisive.").
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Equality, as I use the term here, means that governed entities are
treated alike for the purposes of joint governance within the order or
institution. The closer that an institution approaches to joint
governance by its members on equal terms, the more equal in this
sense it is. It means that what we are calling the terms of the political
proposition are set jointly by governed entities within the order or
institution on equal terms, with that proposition then available for
acceptance or rejection by each governed entity.129 This criterion has
an obvious relationship with democratic principles of institutional
design. As I use the term, it has nothing to do with distribution of
resources, except to the extent that this affects the ability to exercise
rights of joint governance on equal terms.130
Independence, as I use the term here, means that governed
entities enjoy freedom and equality themselves, rather than through
the intermediation of other entities whose choices are ascribed to the
governed entities by theories of representation or agency.13 1 This does
not mean that governed entities "may not" or "should not," in any
relevant sense, appoint agents, representatives, or delegates to
perform functions of governance; it just means that the choices and
powers of agents, representatives, and delegates are not to be ascribed
to the governed entities themselves for the purposes of determining
whether and to what extent the criteria of freedom and equality are
satisfied. All that the independence criterion requires is that we look
to the governed entities themselves, rather than to their agents or
representatives, to determine the extent to which they are free and
equal.
Political autonomy, as I use the term here, thus takes the capacity
of a governed entity for choice-specifically, the choice to bear
particular obligations and duties-as the ultimate source of all moral
claims on that entity. It is premised on the view (which could fairly be
called Kantian) that governed entities that we take to be capable of
rational choice can set normative ends for themselves, and that
normative ends for such governed entities can be set only by the
129. The criterion of equality has a range of important and difficult implications-
including what counts as a right of "governance" and what exactly "treated alike" might
mean-which I do not develop here.
130. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 55, at 148-50 (discussing the fair value of
political liberties).
131. There is a resonance here with Rousseau's view that citizens in a
representative democracy are "free only during the election of the members of
parliament." ROUSSEAU, supra note 62, at 219. See also, e.g., ISAIAH BERLIN, LIBERTY
180-81 (2002) (criticizing unwarranted ascription of freedom of choice); JOSEPH A.
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOcIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 247-49 (1950) (criticizing




entities themselves.132 It reflects the view that "[t]he capacity for self-
conscious reflection about our own actions confers on us a kind of
authority over ourselves, and it is this authority which gives
normativity to moral claims."'3 3 I offer no account here of how governed
entities come to exercise this authority to select and submit to
normative commitments and claims, but there is an interesting
resonance with Harold Koh's account of "transnational egal process":
One or more transnational actors provokes an interaction (or series of
interactions) with another, which forces an interpretation or enunciation of the
global norm applicable to the situation. By so doing, the moving party seeks not
simply to coerce the other party, but to internalize the new interpretation of the
international norm into the other party's internal normative system. The aim is
to "bind" that other party to obey the interpretation as part of its internal value
set. 134
In its account of freedom and independence in particular, political
autonomy takes seriously and literally the problem that Rousseau
purported to solve, but could be said more candidly to have avoided:
the project of political association without loss of freedom.135
It will be clear that my account draws on resources from Kant's
moral theory and, to a more limited extent, his political philosophy,
while remaining utterly at odds with central elements of his own views.
I share Kant's foundational commitment to the status of governed
persons as free, equal, and independent,'3 6 and his view, with its roots
in Rousseau, that moral normativity must be discerned by moral
agents individually through reflection and submitted to voluntarily,
rather than identified and imposed externally.'3 7 The value of political
autonomy, in the form that I offer it, is reflected in commitments that
resonate with Kant's account of moral duty: a commitment to a
132. Compare, e.g., CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD ET AL., THE SOURCES OF
NORMATIVITY 19 (Onora O'Neill ed., 1996) ("Kantians believe that the source of the
normativity of moral claims must be found in the agent's own will, in particular in the
fact that the laws of morality are the laws of the agent's own will and that its claims are
ones she is prepared to make on herself."), with IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS 21-22 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1797) (arguing that moral duties cannot
be externally prescribed: all ethical lawgiving must be internal in nature) [hereinafter
MORALS], and IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 40
(Hackett Classics 1981) (1785) (referring to "the dignity of a rational being who obeys no
law except what he at the same time enacts himself') (emphasis added) [hereinafter
GROUNDING].
133. KORSGAARD, supra note 132, at 19-20.
134. Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599, 2646 (1997) (emphasis in original).
135. ROUSSEAU, supra note 62, at 164.
136. KANT, supra note 55, at 72-77.
137. See, e.g., MORALS, supra note 132, at 21-22; GROUNDING, supra note 132, at
44-48. See also, e.g., ROUSSEAU, supra note 62, at 167 ("[T]o be driven by appetite alone
is slavery, and obedience to the law one has prescribed for oneself is liberty.").
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universalizable normative framework that can be applied to and
accepted by each moral agent on equal terms, reflecting their
essentially equal status as subjects and sources of moral claims; a
commitment to respect the capacity and right of each moral agent to
set ends for itself; and, a commitment to structure collective life in a
way that allows each moral agent to pursue its own ends compatibly
with the pursuit of ends by others.138
But, in other and perhaps deeper respects, my view is solidly and
profoundly opposed to Kant's. Kant himself would of course be horrified
by it. There is no space in my account for Kant's utterly central concept
of the universal moral law, or for the proposition that the authority of
its dictates is grounded in reason as such.'3 9 Kant would also criticize
my failure to differentiate between persons and states. Nor does my
account accommodate the triune assumption (God, free will, and
immortality) that provides the normative engine for Kant's moral
law.140 To borrow from Philippa Foot, my view of normativity in
political orders can be summarized with perfect accuracy as a system
of hypothetical imperatives.141 And I share even less in common with
Kant's political philosophy of the state.142
At the risk of overplaying the Kantian connection, my conception
of political autonomy has a partial counterpart in Christine
Korsgaard's account in her marvelous book The Sources of
Normativity.143 In her analysis, rational entities come to submit
themselves to sets of normative commitments-which she calls
"practical identities"-that govern the normative landscape of their
choices and help to define their moral personhood.144 A conception of
one's own practical identity-of one's own normative commitments and
the things that one is prepared to regard as offering reasons for
action-is, practically speaking, necessary: "for without it [one] cannot
have reasons to act."1 4 5 The account of political autonomy I offer here
does not rest on a concept of "identity," but clearly something similar
is being done. The appeal of political autonomy rests on the idea that
there is a sense in which a state in an international institution-or a
natural person in a national order, for that matter-is a rational actor
in a sphere of normativity, an entity capable of accepting norms and
138. See, e.g., GROUNDING, supra note 132, at 19-44.
139. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTIcAL REASON 107 (Hackett Classics
1981) (1788).
140. GROUNDING, supra note 132, at 49-62.
141. See Philippa Foot, Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives, 81 PHIL.
REV. 305 (1972).
142. To give an easy example, I cannot join Kant's account of independence. KANT,
supra note 55, at 75-77.
143. See generally KORSGAARD, supra note 132.
144. Id. at 103-05.
145. Id. at 120.
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rules and orders as normative for itself, with normativity to be found
in that very acceptance. Thus, in my account, just as in Korsgaard's,
there is a sense in which "self-conceptions are essential to the
normativity of reasons."146
This comparison turns the spotlight on an objection-which the
reader may by now have been nursing for some time-to the whole idea
of political autonomy as an approach to normativity in the
international sphere. The objection could be formulated in something
like the following terms: A model premised on the inherent value of
autonomy may be fine for natural persons, but it is quite inapposite for
states. States do not experience the phenomenon of choice, nor do they
need practical identities: they do not have moral identities or moral
lives of the kind on which political autonomy must rely to generate
normativity. In fact, states do not exist at all for the purposes of moral
analysis; they are just imaginary constructs that we use for heuristic
purposes, and for convenience, as part of ordering political life. To
ascribe moral identity or moral significance to them, is a serious
mistake. Persons, and only persons, constitute the substance of the
moral universe.14 7
This is an important objection that touches the deep literature on
what political theorists call the "domestic analogy,"148 and it requires
a much deeper and more thoughtful reply than I shall give it here. But
it does not convince. Of course, the primary units of moral action and
moral experience are human persons. But we are capable of cognizing
something that we perceive, for some purposes, as a single but
composite entity called the state, the actions and choices of which-
themselves the output of the actions and choices of many individual
natural persons149-are susceptible of moral analysis. Schools,
churches, and corporations are not natural persons, but they
recognizably engage in acts and "behavior" that we regard, in both
everyday moral life and in moral theory, as having a moral character,
reflecting in part compliance with and violations of legal and moral
norms. So it is with states: states as states (although obviously as a
function of the behavior of human persons) make things that are
recognizable as commitments and choices, give and withhold consent
that we regard as having normative significance, appear to our moral
146. Id. at 247.
147. See, e.g., CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 71-83 (1979); BUCHANAN, supra note 83, at 304.
148. See generally David Singh Grewal, The Domestic Analogy Revisited: Hobbes
on International Order, 125 YALE L.J. 618 (2016); Maximilian Terhalle, The Sociological
Turn: Bringing the Domestic Analogy Back In, 48 INT'L STUD. 165 (2011); Philip
Lawrence, The Domestic Analogy and the Liberal State, 10 POL. 20 (1990).
149. It is impossible here not to recall the title page of Leviathan, depicting an
entity that is both many individual persons and also one entity. HOBBES, supra note 108,
at 2.
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sight, and are the subject of moral and legal claims. In countless ways,
state action, as such, engages our moral intuitions.
International law and international orders address themselves to
states as states, and we speak of "state consent," "state responsibility,"
and "state action" as meaningful concepts in international legal theory.
Recognizing that atoms and only atoms constitute the substance of the
physical universe does not prevent us from talking helpfully about
molecules, trees, rocks, and star clusters. In sum, there is a meaningful
perspective that we can (and routinely do) adopt in which the state is
reified for the purposes of moral analysis. States, like corporations and
churches, bear a kind of ascriptive moral personhood. Nor need one
think that this proposition of ascriptive moral personhood is
incompatible with the commitments of liberal normative theory,
particularly when it is applied, as it is applied here, to the "upwards"
relationships of states as governed entities (i.e., to the relationship
between states and institutions that govern states) rather than
"downwards" relationships of states as governing entities (i.e., to the
relationship between states and their citizens).15 0 As John Rawls put
it, "[i]t is incorrect to say that liberalism focuses solely on the rights of
individuals; rather, the rights it recognizes are to protect associations,
smaller groups, and individuals, all from one another in an appropriate
balance specified by its guiding principles of justice."'
Returning to Korsgaard then, I think there are excellent reasons
to think that the moral life of the state-meaning the life of the state,
viewed morally-is structured by a series of overlapping identities and
commitments in a way that has something relevant in common with
the moral life of persons. A state may be conceived of as a liberal
democratic state, as a secular or Muslim or Christian or Buddhist
state, as a member of the community of nations, as a participant in a
project of regional or international peace or prosperity, as a partner in
a project of international integration, as a member of the trading
community of nations, as a champion of particular values, and so on.
It seems immensely difficult to deny that states are not charged,
colored, and partly constituted by such identities, which, of course,
change and develop over time, sometimes rapidly and often profoundly.
And it is far from implausible to suggest that we find, in the fabric of
those identities, commitments to the normativity of particular
obligations or to the moral claims of the structures of international
political life-something very much like Korsgaard's practical
150. There is of course a great deal more to say about this complex question, which
I will take up in detail elsewhere. It should be evident that my view shares some
important features with that of Ronald Dworkin. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S
EMPIRE 168-75 (Hart 1986). For a different view, see for example Jeremy Waldron, Are
Sovereigns Entitled to the Benefit of the International Rule of Law?, 22 EUR. J. INT'L L.
315, 337-43 (2011).
151. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at 221 n.8.
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identities. There is also a resonance here with Thomas Franck's
elegant speculation that "one might hypothesize that nations obey
rules of the community of states because they thereby manifest their
membership in that community, which, in turn, validates their
statehood."1 5 2
2. Exit Rights as an Instantiation of Political Autonomy
In light of the foregoing, it should be clear that exit rights make
an important but partial contribution to political autonomy. They
contribute partially but importantly to the freedom of governed
entities: that is, the voluntariness of the role or status to which the
claims of an order or institution are appurtenant. Exit rights do not
directly promote equality or independence as I have defined them.
For any individual governed entity, there are three principal ways
in which the strong version of freedom can be reflected in a legal order
or institution: the entity can be given the power to make norms by
unilateral fiat, the power to exercise a unilateral veto, or the power to
exit the order or institution at will. The first power (fiat) is inconsistent
with political autonomy's commandment of equality. The second power
(veto) is fine from the point of view of freedom (and from the point of
view of equality, so long as everyone else has a veto as well) but is
unlikely to lead to very much getting done.153 But the third power (exit)
offers a much broader space in which joint governance can operate
within the order or institution to determine the terms of what I have
called the "political proposition," while protecting the freedom of every
governed entity to accept or decline it at will. Accordingly, this third
option-exit rights-will very commonly be the most appealing way,
all things considered, to institutionalize the command that political
autonomy makes: that all governed entities shall remain free.
Exit rights, of course, only partly instantiate political autonomy.
They do nothing to further the demands of equality, and they must be
held by the governed entity itself if the criterion of independence is to
be satisfied. But, in conferring the right to set aside the status to which
content-neutral claims of acceptance and compliance attach, exit lays
the foundation for political autonomy's version of freedom.
152. FRANCK, supra note 84, at 8.
153. As Richard Epstein puts it, "[1]et every political actor have a veto right, and
political paralysis will follow." RICHARD EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL
CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT 22 (2014) [hereinafter
EPSTEIN, CLASSICAL LIBERAL]. However, the threat of inaction is not always or
necessarily troubling: in such circumstances a veto right may be perfectly acceptable. My
thanks to Thomas Streinz for pointing this out to me.
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D. Exit Legitimacy and the International Sphere
In closing the affirmative case for exit legitimacy, I want to argue
that, while it is applicable to a great many orders and institutions of
all kinds, it may be a particularly appropriate device for the analysis
of international institutions. In this Section, I give four reasons for this
claim, drawing freely on the thin and thick accounts.
First, the maximization of exit legitimacy in particular and
political autonomy in general is an appropriate response to the view-
prominently articulated by Jeremy Waldron, among others154-that
deep disagreement about value is a fundamental and ineluctable fact
of political life. And nowhere is this more true than in international
political life. Ensuring that international institutions respect the
freedom, equality, and independence of participant states allows states
to participate in the international order without sacrificing their
character as the ultimate arbiters of the normativity of their own
political lives, or the right of each to chart a course that is its own. So,
if we consider it desirable to structure international institutions that
can accommodate states that have, or believe they may in the future
have, radical disagreements about values-including the place of
democracy, religion, individual rights, and so on in public life-political
autonomy may offer a promising normative foundation for the design
of those institutions. Taking political autonomy seriously would allow
states to pursue common projects not only with those states with which
they already agree, but also with those with which they profoundly
disagree about the foundations of social order, or even the purpose of
the common projects that they desire to pursue together. 155 It allows
for the construction of liberal institutions with illiberal members and
agreement about action despite disagreement about value.156
Second, maximizing exit legitimacy in particular and political
autonomy in general allows for the institutional preconditions of
whatever epistemic and axiological convergence might ultimately be
possible in international political life. By this I mean that, to the extent
that governed entities can be expected to approach a consensus on
154. See generally JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999); see also,
e.g., AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOcRAcY AND DISAGREEMENT 11-51(1996)
(discussing "the persistence of moral disagreement").
155. I want to raise, but will not develop, the point that the foundational role in
my account of voluntary submission to a norm as the source of its moral claims on
governed entities chimes suggestively with the requirement of opinio juris in customary
international law, and even helps to explain its apparent circularity: under that doctrine,
too, the acceptance of and submission to a rule or principle as normative becomes the
very source of its normativity.
156. Of course, political autonomy remains an avowedly liberal model: it will not
appeal to those whose own normative commitments are inconsistent with the freedom,
equality, and independence of other governed entities. This does not unduly trouble me.
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what is good, valuable, and rightful-however gradually, painfully,
and imperfectly they may do so-they are likely to do so by engaging
with one another within institutions and orders, even institutions and
orders that are institutionally thin and/or functionally limited. 157 The
protection of political autonomy in institutional design may therefore
be particularly apt in spheres like the international one where there
is, so to speak, a great deal of value-convergence work to be done. By
suggesting an approach to political order that enables states, societies,
and persons to engage with one another before strong value
convergence has been achieved, political autonomy facilitates the
gradual formation of a community of knowledge and values, and thus
the emergence of agreements around value that provide the premise
for more integrated institutional arrangements. Amanda Perreau-
Sassine expresses something similar when she comments that, for
Kant, "juridical law allows for (although certainly does not necessitate)
international publicity for enlightened thought and the emergence of
an ever growing ethical cosmopolitan community."158 Quite so.
Third, exit legitimacy may be easier to achieve, practically
speaking, in international orders and institutions than in many
national orders. A natural person seeking to exit from a state must, in
almost all circumstances, physically relocate; this may be expensive,
time consuming, difficult, and dangerous. Such a natural person will
also need to find "entry" elsewhere in order to avoid the unwelcome
prospect of statelessness. By contrast, the withdrawal of states from
international institutions typically involves fewer issues of physicality;
more of it can be resolved, so to speak, on the papers, and the exiting
state need not "enter" another institution in the same way that a
natural person must urgently find another state of citizenship. Thus,
there is a sense in which exit choices may be more easily recognized as
"free" in the relevant sense for states at the international level than for
natural persons at the national level. But all this is not to deny that
there are immense practical problems (many of which may have a
physical dimension) involved in withdrawal from an international
institution, nor to deny that the prospect of exit may be immensely
unappetizing (these objections to exit legitimacy will be discussed in
the next Part).15 9 It is simply to point out that concerns of this kind
may be softer for states in international institutions than for natural
persons in nation-states.
Fourth, there may be a sharper need for exit legitimacy in
international institutions, where many of the usual sources of
legitimacy of various kinds-democratic, social-contractarian,
157. The work of the deliberative democrats i  obviously apposite here.
158. Amanda Perreau-Saussine, Immanuel Kant on International Law, in THE
PHMLOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 69 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010)
(emphasis omitted).
159. See infra Section IV.A (discussing cost of exit).
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traditional, and so forth-may be weaker or absent. The legitimacy of
international institutions is a relatively new problem in the field of
political thought, and it does not seem that much in the way of a deep
consensus has been achieved. But it is well established, to the point of
triteness, that democracy is a slender reed at the international level,
both because international orders are connected weakly to national
democratic processes and because there are very few international
democratic processes to speak of at all. 160 Instead, international
institutions are frequently dominated by what Allen Buchanan and
Robert Keohane have called "bureaucratic discretion."1 61 Other
accounts of institutional legitimacy in the international sphere-
functional or rational accounts, for example-bring their own
problems, but this is hardly the place for a full examination; it is
enough to observe that the problem of the legitimacy of international
institutions remains a particularly thorny one and that the need for
additional and supplementary sources of legitimacy may be
particularly sharp in the international space.
IV. SOME OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES
This Part considers what may be the four most important
objections to exit legitimacy. I will argue that none of these is fatal but
that each offers useful insights into the ways in which exit rights can
be effectively instantiated in practice.
A. Cost, Burden, and Attachment
The first objection to exit rights as a source of legitimacy is that
exit is just too difficult to do much normative work. This objection was
advanced seminally by David Hume in his essay Of the Original
Contract, in which he took the view that "it would be absurd to infer a
consent or choice" from failure to exit from a political order.162 He
continued in language already quoted above:
Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave
his country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives from day
to day, by the small wage which he acquires? We may as well assert, that a man,
by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master; though
he was carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean, and perish,
the moment he leaves her.163
160. See, e.g., Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 102, at 406; HANNUM, supra note
89, at 10; Kumm, supra note 86, at 915-16; Bodansky, supra note 39, at 600.
161. Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 102, at 414.




John Simmons managed to improve on this fine illustration:
"[a]nyone with an objection to my proposal will kindly so indicate by
lopping off his arm at the elbow."164 The point is well taken.
But I have never thought this argument is quite as good as it
looks, and not just because my claim is limited to the modest position
that exit rights contribute to legitimating resources, that is, they make
things better than they otherwise would be. The Hume-Simmons
objection actually comes in at least three forms: first, exit may be
practically unavailable for many governed entities because they lack
the resources to undertake it;' 6 5 second, even when it is practically
possible, exit from a political order or institution strains the bonds of
attachment, culture, and identity so much that it cannot usefully be
thought of as a "free" option for governed entities;6 6 and, third, even
when exit is practically possible, exit from a political order or
institution often causes so much economic and political harm that it
should be disregarded.167 While distinct, these formulations are closely
related to one another and will be considered together here. Not all of
the responses below apply to each form of the objection, but the
meaning should be clear.
First, note that the thrust of the objection is that, whatever the
normative value of an exit right in principle, in practice it is so hard or
requires the surrender of so much that it is not fit to do much useful
work. In other words, exit rights are of limited normative significance
because they are often hard to use. But this puts the cart of
institutional implementation before the horse of normative inquiry.
First we should ask whether and how exit rights can be normatively
significant, specifically, whether they are capable of conferring an
important form of legitimacy upon an order or institution. If so, then
we should address our minds to the question of how to institutionalize
those rights appropriately, and to identifying the orders and
institutions in which this can feasibly be done. The aim of this Article
is to show that the first, normative, question should be answered in the
affirmative. If I have succeeded in doing so, this objection (at least in
its first and third forms) simply prompts the institutional project of
164. SIMMONS, supra note 57, at 81.
165. Hume's point falls into this category. See also, e.g., Okin, supra note 22, at
216-22 (identifying barriers to the exit of girls and women from many political orders).
166. See, e.g., Reitman, supra note 41, at 195 ("One may fear the loss of moral
support and the sense of belonging and rootedness derived from community. Or one may
simply fear change and the unknown. The idea of rupture with one's family and the
people with whom one is closest is pretty hard to conceive in any situation. On top of
these difficulties, one can add obstacles which stem from the fact that cultural
membership can be pervasively defining of one's sense of self.").
167. See, e.g., Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 102, at 414 ("From the standpoint
of a particular weak democratic state, participation in global governance institutions
such as the WTO is hardly voluntary, since the state would suffer serious costs by not
participating.").
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figuring out how to confer exit rights in a way that fits our all-things-
considered preferences.
Second, the strong form of this objection relies on a proposition
about circumstances in the world: exit is de facto impossible because it
is prohibitively costly, burdensome, traumatic, and so on. But this begs
an important empirical question, on which the objection does not seem
to have the facts all its own way. And the objection is least convincing
in the sphere that is our primary focus here: state withdrawal from
international institutions. There is virtually no situation in which a
state's withdrawal from an international institution would really be so
harmful as to be virtually impossible; the analogy with an
impoverished citizen contemplating emigration simply does not
survive cursory inspection. (We will consider below the argument from
serious harm that does not rise to the level of de facto impossibility.)
As noted above, de facto exit from an international institution
seems to be practically possible even in the absence of an exit right,1 68
so there is reason to doubt the idea that exit is de facto impossible in
the presence of such a right. Indeed, Laurence Helfer's crucial recent
work has demonstrated that exit is not at all a vanishingly rare
phenomenon, merely an infrequent one.16 9 Timothy Meyer agrees,
highlighting "the importance of exit as an empirical phenomenon," and
noting moreover that "we should only observe an exit when the threat
of exit has failed to spur renegotiation."17 0 In other words, the practical
significance of exit is not exhausted by occasions on which exit actually
takes place.
Moreover, the fact that most states tend not to abandon their roles
as duty-bearing actors in international life at the first sign of burden
does not at all suggest that the option is "unrealistic"; it is equally
consistent with the proposition that most states, most of the time, find
the tangible and intangible benefits from international institutional
life to be worth reaping (and the costs of isolation worth avoiding), and
that most states, most of the time, take their international roles
seriously even when the balance of material benefits tips
unhelpfully.171 So the empirical basis for this objection seems absent
in the sphere on which we are focused here.
Even with regard to national orders, note that migration and
emigration appear to be practically possible for a great many
168. See supra Section II.A.
169. Helfer, supra note 79, at 1602.
170. Meyer, supra note 112, at 389.
171. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 134, at 2599 (quoting Louis Henkin's comment that
"almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of
their obligations almost all of the time," and noting that "empirical work since then
seems largely to have confirmed this hedged but optimistic description"); FRANcK, supra
note 84, at 92 (noting "that there is a demonstrable historical pattern of prevalent state
compliance" with international law).
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individuals, including those in unpromising circumstances.172 To take
an example at the very sharpest end of the stick, consider what might
be the most difficult exit to accomplish in the contemporary political
world: the exit of a natural person from North Korea. But between
10,000 and 300,000 persons have accomplished such an exit to China
alone, and that is in the absence of a legal exit right.173 Natural persons
with the fewest resources (in a broad sense) may be precisely those who
are most likely to be willing to give up their stakes in the domestic
order and take their chances with exit, and they may also be those
persons for whom an exit right, as a resource of last resort, is most
important. Conversely, natural persons with more resources are likely
to be better able to exit. So, without ignoring the fact that exit often
comes with great costs (especially for natural persons, with whom we
are not primarily concerned here), it is not at all clear that exit is an
unrealistic or illusory prospect in most cases.
Third, it is not obvious that we should be deeply concerned that
exit is often so costly and difficult as to be a remedy of absolute last
resort. In some sense, perhaps, it should be so. Joint endeavor with
others, in a shared political and institutional life, is deeply imperfect,
frustrating, and costly. When exit is troubling and unappetizing, and
when we are bound to a relevant order or institution by ties of
identification, attachment, and perhaps even love, then we are more
likely to commit resources and energy to pursuing a solution together
rather than jumping ship at the first sign of bad weather. This is
closely related to the phenomenon that Albert Hirschman describes as
loyalty-a "special attachment to an organization"174-and, as he
points out, loyalty is a powerful factor in discouraging overly rapid exit,
in encouraging participation within the organization, and in
facilitating organizational improvement and recovery.175 So the very
bonds of identity, culture, and cost that are urged as an objection to
exit are exactly those things that make it possible to confer and protect
exit rights-what I have called the freedom aspect of political
autonomy-without fatally undermining the basis for collective life.176
172. See, e.g., DowTY, supra note 2, at 22 ("[E]ven traditional agricultural
societies, made up of stolid peasants supposedly rooted to the soil, seem to have been
highly mobile.").
173. See Jiyoung Song, Twenty Years'Evolution ofNorth Korean Migration, 1994-
2014: A Human Security Perspective, 2 ASIA & THE PAC. POL. STUDS. 399, 401 (2015) ("No
official data is available on how many North Koreans live in the Republic of China (PRC).
In the early 2000s, the PRC government's estimation is around 10,000-50,000; the
[Republic of South Korea] at 30,000-50,000; the US State Department at 75,000-
125,000; the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) at 50,000-
100,000; and NGOs at 100,000-300,000.") (citations omitted).
174. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 20, at 77.
175. Id. at 77-79.
176. Karen Johnson is therefore quite wrong to suggest that laying emphasis on
exit "suggests that the commitment of the citizen is or ought to be like that of the
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In other words, we may want exit to be difficult, even traumatic, in
light of the great value that we place on collective political enterprise.
Fourth-and I have saved the most important response for last-
note that exit legitimacy, in both its thin and thick accounts, is a
normativity of choice. And the thrust of this objection, except in cases
of de facto impossibility, is that a choice is less free to the extent that
it is costly or difficult or unpleasant o do otherwise.177 Buchanan and
Keohane exemplify this criticism when they say that, "[flrom the
standpoint of a particular weak democratic state, participation in
global governance institutions such as the WTO is hardly voluntary,
since the state would suffer serious costs by not participating."1 78 Well,
if this is right-if "serious costs" implies that exit is not meaningfully
available, and that remaining is not meaningfully consensual-then I
am wrong. But I am not wrong. Start with the easy case in which an
order or institution X becomes more profitable for its governed entities
(e.g., it raises its daily cash disbursements to all members from
$500,000 to $1,000,000); it is wholly unconvincing to say that the
governed entities are now less "free" to leave it than they were before
(because the cost of leaving has risen from $500,000/day to
$1,000,000/day). Such reasoning fails to impress our moral intuitions.
So it cannot be right that I am less free to leave X just because leaving
X would make me a good deal worse off than I am within X.
Perhaps I am ducking the problem here by choosing a rosy,
abstract example and sticking to cold currency, when the real problem
here is that the "exit choice" may be between an unjust or exploitative
order or institution and an equally (or more) unappealing world outside
the order or institution. So let me generalize the point. It is true that
sometimes the choices that entities face are very unappetizing. But
that does not without more vitiate their character as free choices over
whatever alternatives they do face. Our moral reaction to such "devil
or the deep blue sea" situations is not that we lose our free agency in
such situations but hat we deplore exceedingly the terms that have
been offered; the problem is not that we are not in a meaningful sense
free, but that we find none of the available choices to be appealing.
Suppose that I am standing in a field with an open hay barn in it. The
owner of the barn has told me that I am quite free, if I would like, to go
satisfied customer: superficial and evanescent, dependent upon the immediate
satisfaction of his needs and wants." Johnson, supra note 57, at 21.
177. See, e.g., TUssMAN, supra note 77, at 38 ("[Ilf we have come to the point at
which we find the inconvenient really impossible then we are beyond the help of political
or moral theory."). I want to set aside, for lack of expertise and space alike, the different
and important question of the impact of socialization on freedom. As Leslie Green
recognizes, this is immensely difficult to figure out. Green, supra note 21, at 173. See
also, e.g., Okin, supra note 22, at 224 (noting that "girls are often successfully socialized
in the acceptance of practices that they would be likely to come to regard as oppressive
if they were living in a less sexist cultural context").
178. Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 102, at 414.
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into the barn. I am, we can agree, free in the ordinary moral sense of
that word to stand in the barn or out in the field. Now, suppose that
the sky darkens, a thundercloud appears, and shafts of lightning start
to strike the ground. I face the same choice as before, except that now
if I stand in the field I may be struck and killed by lightning (and I will
surely get wet in any event), but if I stand in the barn I may be burned
alive if it is struck by lightning. My situation is now of course
exceedingly bad. But have I become less free just because my options
are now pretty miserable?
I think the answer is obviously no. Our intuitive reaction to the
badness of a situation like this is not that I am not free to go into the
barn: it is that I should not, in whatever sense might be relevant, be
made to choose between a risk of being baked in a barn and a risk of
being flash-fried in a field. And that objection is perfectly good on its
own terms, as a criticism of the adequacy of my options. 179 But I am
not less free to choose as between the options. The choice-field or
barn-is exactly as free as it was before it started to rain. If I have a
right to be free from torture and I am given the choice between being
tortured with water or being tortured with fire (each identically cruel,
painful, and degrading), the problem is not lack of free choice but the
invasion of my right to be free from torture. Harry Beran seems to
agree with me on this point and gives two further examples that I like
enough to share in full:
Green has an illness which is fatal unless dealt with in hospital. Hospitals
require that patients agree to observe their rules while there. Green not only
dislikes being in hospital as such but also objects to being bound by rules in
whose making he had no say. Does Green's (reluctant) agreement to observe the
hospital rules not come off because the alternative to agreeing is certain death?
[That is, certain death unless, we might add to Beran's example to make the
analogy more perfect, he can get himself admitted to another hospital, although
the rules in those other hospitals may be even worse.] Brown, who is wealthy
and detests lawyers, has been arrested on a charge of murder but is innocent.
She has so little knowledge of the law and court procedures that she is likely to
be convicted unless she hires an attorney. Does her agreement to pay standard
legal fees to the attorney not come off because the likely cost of not agreeing to
this is conviction of murder? [Again, unless she can find another lawyer,
recognizing that other lawyers may be even more expensive, less able, or both.]
According to received moral opinion, the answer in both cases is no. Moreover,
received opinion probably has wisdom on its side here. 180
179. See, e.g., David Miller, Immigration: The Case for Limits, in CONTEMPORARY
DEBATES IN APPLIED ETHICS 196 (Andrew Cohen & Christopher Wellman eds., 2004)
("[W]hat a person can legitimately demand access to is an adequate range of options to
choose between - a reasonable choice of occupation, religion, cultural activities, marriage
partners, and so forth.") (emphasis in original); EPSTEIN, CLASSICAL LIBERAL, supra note
153, at 202 (discussing the classic highwayman's challenge and commenting that "the
coercion becomes clear, because each person is entitled to both his money and his life,
and thus should not be forced to choose between them").
180. BERAN, supra note 65, at 105.
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Thus, ultimately, this objection boils down to two observations:
first, that exit rights can be expensive, difficult, and even painful to
use, particularly at the national level; and second, that exit legitimacy
is no substitute for justice, fairness, and the protection of rights. These
observations can be accepted without difficulty. But, even granting
that the exercise of exit rights is often impractical except in pretty
tough circumstances-though this does not really seem to be the
situation for states in the international order-it does not follow that
exit rights are meaningless when they are in fact practical, nor that
they are meaningless under tough circumstances (when, in fact, they
may be most important). What remains is the proposition of
institutional design that-assuming the normative core of my
argument is accepted-it would be desirable to structure exit rights in
a way that makes them practically available, that is, they must be
realistic and not merely formal. And we have already acknowledged-
indeed, emphasized-this point above.18 1
B. Insufficiency
The second objection is that exit rights are too weak to confer
much legitimacy on an order or institution. In a political order that is
unfair, unjust, or exploitative, "love it or leave it" seems a glib and
inadequate response. This point has been widely made. Leslie Green,
for example, has noted that "[a] violation of civil liberties does not
become tolerable just because citizens may emigrate, although it is
true that, if they may not, then things are even worse."182 Ayelet
Schachar makes a similar point when she criticizes the inadequacy of
a "right of exit 'solution' [that] throws on the already beleaguered
individual the responsibility to either miraculously transform the
legal-institutional conditions that keep her vulnerable or find the
resources to leave her whole world behind."1 83 And Allen Buchanan
attacks the normative force not just of exit but of consent itself:
The fact that I have consented to government cannot itself show that I am
obligated to comply with its demands, because there are some things that no
government should require of anyone (namely, acts that are grossly immoral),
and the fact that I have consented to government cannot change this. But once
we hedge our consent-based obligations by appeal to independent moral
principles, especially principles of justice, the question arises as to whether we
can dispense with consent and simply argue that we ought to comply with a
system of laws if it promotes justice and does so in ways that are themselves
just.184
181. See supra subsection III.A.2.
182. Green, supra note 21, at 165.
183. Schachar, supra note 22, at 80.
184. BUCHANAN, supra note 83, at 246.
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The best response to this set of objections is that they prompt the
wrong answer because they ask the wrong question. The question-or
at least my question-is not whether rights of exit convert an order
from an abstractly illegitimate one to an abstractly legitimate one, nor
is it whether exit rights can be a substitute for justice, fairness, and so
on. The question is rather whether rights of exit can make a
contribution to the legitimacy of an order-that is, whether they can
contribute to the set of well-founded reasons that can be offered to
governed entities to accept or comply with an order.
The answer is that of course exit rights make a contribution, for
the reasons given in the thin and thick accounts above: they
operationalize consent and they partly instantiate political autonomy.
Under virtually any set of circumstances, the conferral of rights to exit
on citizens can add to the store of reasons to accept or comply with the
order and its outputs. Whether this is enough, all things considered,
for acceptance or compliance, is a matter for each governed entity to
determine independently: it seems unlikely that, in most cases, it
would be sufficient without much more. And what more, exactly, is
needed will probably depend on the type of order or institution at issue.
More generally, the criticism that rights of exit are never
sufficient seems not quite in order. Surely no single type of right is
enough, alone, to legitimate an order, in the sense that it would
establish a legitimacy claim that almost everyone would recognize as
adequate under most circumstances.s18  Take what may be the two
foundational political rights (though we might argue about their
relative priority): the right to vote and the right to free expression. A
society that protected only one of these rights, or even both of them and
no others, could fail to satisfy even rudimentary standards of
legitimacy in any of a dozen ways. The truth is that we care about a
great many things, and we demand much of our political institutions.
Exit legitimacy is a small but important piece of a very complicated
puzzle; it is nothing more, but also nothing less, than that.
Thus, in Schachar's terms, this Article does not purport to offer a
"solution": exit rights are not a panacea to cure all ills, nor should they
justify "turning a blind eye," as she puts it, to problems and injustices
within political orders.186 But, if a house is on fire, we can agree both
that the fire should be put out and that it would be a good thing if the
people inside can get out. And that is the extent of my claim.
185. Chandran Kukathas seems to come perilously close, at times, to making this
argument, but if I understand his thought correctly he does so for institutions (like
cultural groups) within a liberal state order that satisfies our broader criteria for
rightness and legitimacy. See Kukathas, Cultural Toleration, supra note 49, at 86;
Kukathas, supra note 26, at 119.
186. Schachar, supra note 22, at 80.
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C. Incentives, Behavior, and the Atrophy of Voice
The third objection is that, even if exit rights can make a
contribution to legitimacy, they have unsalutary consequences for
behavior and incentives within the order or institution. An excellent
example of this attack comes from a well-known contribution of Cass
Sunstein to the secession literature:
[W]hether or not secession might be justified as a matter of politics or morality,
constitutions ought not to include a right to secede. To place such a right in a
founding document would increase the risks of ethnic and factional struggle;
reduce the prospects for compromise and deliberation in government; raise
dramatically the stakes of day-to-day political decisions; introduce irrelevant and
illegitimate considerations into those decisions; create dangers of blackmail,
strategic behavior, and exploitation; and, most generally, endanger the prospects
for long-term self-governance.187
Generalizing away from secession-which, as noted above, raises
a whole host of special difficulties apart from our core concerns18 -
and focusing on the primary case of states in international institutions
(and keeping in the background the secondary case of natural persons
in a national order), the broader point is that, when exit rights exist,
they affect behavior inside the institution. Members of a political order
may be able to threaten to exit (perhaps creating "holdup"
problems8 9), internal political decisions may be distorted and even
dominated by "exit dynamics," and members may polarize into
"exiters" and "remainers"1 90 who are less willing and able to share
political life. We may kill our community in trying to make it free.
This argument goes on to claim that exit restrictions may
facilitate productive and effective collective life. To stay with Sunstein
for a moment, he gives the example of marriage and argues that "[a]
decision to stigmatize divorce or to make it available only under certain
conditions-as virtually every state in the United States has done-
may lead to happier as well as more stable marriages, by providing an
incentive for spouses to adapt their behavior and even their desires to
promote long-term harmony."'9 ' Likewise, Hirschman argued
187. Sunstein, supra note 90, at 634.
188. See id. at 651 n.88 (noting the special considerations that generate
"asymmetry between two seemingly parallel rights, that of emigration and that of
secession").
189. See, e.g., Julia Gray & Jonathan B. Slapin, Exit Options and the Effectiveness
of Regional Economic Organizations, 1 POL. Scl. RES. & METHODS 281, 285 (2013)
("Large states with good alternatives for trade beyond a potential REO can make
demands on the other potential members. These other members must comply with the
demands of the state with outside options to prevent it from exiting the agreement.").
190. Cf., e.g., Hirschman, supra note 10, at 197 (describing the "high-loyalty"
Bleibers and the "low-loyalty" Ausreisers in East Germany).
191. Sunstein, supra note 90, at 649.
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famously that the availability of exit makes members of an institution
less willing to exercise powers of constructive criticism (or "voice")
within the organization. As he put it, "[t]he presence of the exit
alternative can . . . tend to atrophy the development of the art of
voice."192 In his account, when a "ready and satisfactory substitute" for
an institution is available, the very same members who might have
been most likely to criticize decline and drive recovery may jump ship,
depriving the institution "of a precious feedback mechanism that
operates at its best when the customers are securely locked in."19 3
Others have also prominently and effectively made similar points
about the unwelcome consequences of exit rights for behavior.194
This is an important objection, but at least four responses present
themselves.s9 5 First, Sunstein and Hirschman are focused on one part
of the story but are missing another, equally important, part. The
availability of an exit option surely affects members' decisions about
responses to decline and difficulty, as they note. But it also affects
decisions about whether to become a member and how much to commit
and invest in the order or institution in the first place. An entity that
knows it has the freedom to exit from an institution if things go sour
will be able to participate more fully than an entity troubled by a risk
of "lock-in": the latter is forced to discount its participation ex ante
against that possibility or to stay out altogether. So, although the
introduction of exit rights may encourage, at least to some extent, exit
at the expense of voice, if and when an order or institution declines or
starts to fail, it is also true that the introduction of exit may encourage
entry, investment, and participation in the order or institution, and
that this additional entry, investment, and participation may make the
crucial contribution to avoiding decline and failure in the first place.
Helfer has made a similar point:
192. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 20, at 43 (emphasis omitted).
193. Id. at 44.
194. See, e.g., Dwight G. Newman, Exit, Voice, and 'Exile': Rights to Exit and
Rights to Eject, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 43, 65 (2007) (noting "the reality that extensive exit
and/or voice options may undermine, in some respect, the integrity of some groups in a
manner destroying or negatively affecting valuable collective interests. . . . [E]xit and
voice options may give rise to free-rider problems that undermine the integral pursuit of
collective interests."); Gray & Slapin, supra note 189, at 285 (noting that the presence of
alternative outset options can impede institutional development); Stilz, supra note 128,
at 66-67; Meyer, supra note 112, at 382 ("A credible threat to exit an international
agreement confers power on a state by allowing the state to demand a greater share of
the gains from cooperation in exchange for participating."); Shorten, supra note 21, at
102 (defining "cynical" and "exploitative" exit threats).
195. In addition to the points I make in the text, I will also add that it is not clear
to me that the survival of an order or institution is necessarily or always a good, or that
the threat of institutional failure is automatically or always a good reason for limiting
freedom. While we very often hope that orders or institutions will survive, there is no
reason to presume ex ante that this is a desirable outcome.
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Denunciation clauses reduce uncertainty by giving states a low cost exit option
if an agreement urns out badly. All other things being equal, such clauses
encourage the ratification of a treaty by a larger number of states than would be
prepared to ratify in the absence of such a clause. They may also enable states
to negotiate deeper or broader commitments than would be attainable for
treaties without unilateral exit.196
Second, recall that exit legitimacy comes with no meta-normative
theory of how it should be traded off against, or for, other things. It is
true, of course, that, in many cases, governed entities may want to tie
themselves and others to the mast and commit to collective action.'97
But in many, and perhaps most cases, this kind of commitment is
perfectly compatible with a right of exit: the tangible and intangible
costs and harms of exit, including the reputational costs of "walking
out" on one's co-venturers and the positive ties of loyalty, identity,
culture, and commitment to a mission will suffice to keep members
committed and to preclude or deter credible threats of exit, making
collective action perfectly possible.9 8 Indeed, despite the widespread
existence of rights of exit from national and international orders,199 in
the great majority of cases, governed entities-natural persons as well
as states-continue to participate in joint action rather than exercising
their withdrawal rights at the first sign of trouble.2 00 Empirically,
"people do not disrupt the unity of an existing state lightly, especially
if it is not in their self-interest and if the grievances which make
secession appealing to them are dealt with fairly and
sympathetically."201 But, in cases where exit rights and some shared
objective are really not compatible, then I make here no strong claim
that exit legitimacy must never be traded away to get other things that
we think important or valuable. As noted above, the ius cogens
peremptory norms of international customary law present a hard case
of this kind.
196. Helfer, supra note 79, at 1599.
197. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY,
PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS 88-167 (2000); Aziz Z. Huq, Does The Logic of
Collective Action Explain Federalism Doctrine? 66 STAN. L. REV. 217, 226 (2014); Robert
Cooter & Neil Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, Section
8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2010).
198. See, e.g., Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive,
Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 267 (2004) ('In the
contemporary WTO context, the threat of unilateral exit has limited credibility because
it would be costly."); Slapin, supra note 80, at 191 (collecting literature on non-credible
exit threats).
199. See supra Section II.A.
200. See, e.g., Cesare Romano, The Shift from the Consensual to the Compulsory
Paradigm in International Adjudication: Elements for a Theory of Consent, 39 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 791, 864 (2007) (noting that state seldom withdraw from the jurisdiction
of international adjudicative bodies).
201. BERAN, supra note 65, at 41.
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Third, it is simply not true that exit always undermines voice; exit
sometimes augments voice.2 0 2 The threat of exit can help to underscore
particular demands and to make sure that members take one another's
concerns seriously; it can "effectively amplify" voice, as Dwight
Newman puts it.203 And, as Oonagh Reitman writes of divorce, "exit
can help cure a group of the oppressive elements of its distinct practices
by exerting pressure to bring about their reform."204 Reitman shows
that exit can be vital if fair bargaining outcomes are to be secured
within the institution. For example, in systems of divorce that deny
women formal exit rights, "women are blackmailed into striking
patriarchal bargains: in exchange for the husband's consent, they
strike unfair deals in respect of matters ancillary to the divorce - as
regards the distribution of income and capital and even arrangements
in respect of children."20 5
One prominent strand of scholarship, building on Charles
Tiebout's seminal work, has elaborated the consequences in positive
theory of the ability of mobile citizens to "vote with their feet" and to
engender desirable regulatory outcomes by facilitating regulatory
competition among jurisdictions (although some have raised concerns
regarding a "race to the bottom").20 6 Sunstein himself points out that
the fact of interstate mobility in the United States [that is, the right of citizens
to exit from one state into another] is probably a far more powerful check against
many forms of state tyranny than the existence of judicial review ... . [T]here
202. See, e.g., Hirschman, supra note 10, at 186 (describing the combination of
exit and voice as a "joint grave-digging act" in East Germany in 1989).
203. Newman, supra note 194, at 49-50; see also Green, supra note 21, at 171
("[flt would be wrong to suppose that the protective function is effective only when exit
is actually exercised. The possibility of exit may itself make the group responsive to the
interests of its members."); Shorten, supra note 21, at 100 ("Providing a group with the
right to exit the federation might, paradoxically, be another way to ensure the stability
and longevity of the union, by discouraging exploitative political (or economic)
arrangements."). Susan Moller Okin reminds us that this effect has limits: groups and
individuals that are unable to exercise or threaten to exercise their exit rights will not
be in a position to exert such discipline, and their concerns may be systematically
neglected. See Okin, supra note 22, at 215.
204. Reitman, supra note 41, at 189.
205. Id. at 192.
206. The literature is voluminous. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty and Damien Geradin,
Regulatory Co-Opetition, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND EcONOMIC INTEGRATION:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 30 (Daniel C. Esty and Damien Geradin eds., 2001);
Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis,
115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 625 (2001); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate
Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental
Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1211 (1992); Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab,
Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion
Inducing?, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 333, 336 (1988); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate
Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure
Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 416 (1956).
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can be no doubt that the right of exit operates as a powerful check on tyranny of
various sorts.207
This role of exit threats can be enhanced through coordination: in
the international sphere, this points toward the prospect of what Julia
Morse and Robert Keohane call "contested multilateralism," as groups
of states within international orders and institutions jointly develop
alternative, competing forms of multilateralism that exert competitive
pressure on the original ones.208 And ultimately, as Green and
Hirschman both observe, exit itself can be an expressive act-one that
is sometimes more expressive and constructive than traditional
methods of voice.209
Fourth, and finally, the alleged evils of exit rights should be
considered in light of the alternatives.210 Susanne Lechner and Renate
Ohr have demonstrated that, under appropriate circumstances, the
"holdup" threat from an exit right is less than that offered by a veto,
which may be the realistic counterfactual in many international
institutions.211 And, as Joseph Weiler has noted, if the choice is
between grudging, reluctant, obstructive participation and graceful
withdrawal, it is clear which should be preferred under many
circumstances:
[The European Union's] fundamental objectives would be irreparably
compromised[] if Member States could systematically avoid their many, often
day-to-day obligations while retaining their membership. Clearly, given these
circumstances, a Member State ... should not be allowed to practice the
alternative techniques for avoiding obligations. If a Member State cannot accept
these obligations, better that it be allowed to withdraw, even unilaterally.212
207. Sunstein, supra note 90, at 658. See also Epstein, supra note 24, at 150
("[E]xit rights under federalism offer an important, indeed indispensable, safeguard
against government abuse.").
208. See Julia C. Morse & Robert 0. Keohane, Contested Multilateralism, 9 REV.
OF INTL ORG. 385, 386 (2014). Note that the two need not always be related: one need
not exit, or threaten to exit, from the original order or institution in order to develop, or
threaten to develop, a competing alternative. Consider, for example, the emergence of
"megaregional" trade agreements against the backdrop of the failure of the Doha Round
of WTO negotiations. I am grateful to Thomas Streinz for suggesting this example.
209. Green, supra note 21, at 171 ("[E]xit may also have an expressive function,
for it is commonly held that leaving is in a way to criticize the group, while remaining is
to support it."); HIRSCHMAN, supra note 20, at 126 ("By exiting one renders his
arguments unanswerable. The remarkable influence wielded by martyrs throughout
history can be understood in those terms, for the martyr's death is exit at its most
irreversible and argument at its most irrefutable.").
210. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING
INSTITUTIONS IN LAw, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 6 (1994) (criticizing "single
institutionalist" analysis that condemns an institutional design without also assessing
the adequacy of the relevant alternative).
211. See Lechner & Ohr, supra note 80, at 361.
212. Weiler, supra note 97, at 298.
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In conclusion, we may think of the third objection much as we
came to think of the first: as framing an institutional design project. It
should remind us to design exit rights in a way that is sensitive to the
other things that we care about in addition to exit legitimacy (e.g., the
solution of collective action problems), and it should encourage us to
think, in particular, about ways to ensure that exit does not come
unnecessarily at the cost of voice. Depending on the nature of the order
or institution, it may be natural to do this by creating exit rights that
require the use of voice: a mechanism for a "voicey exit" that avoids or
minimizes the atrophy effect. But we can see that exit rights are by no
means incompatible with such solutions, nor with the difficult, messy,
and costly business of living together with others under conditions of
persistent and often profound disagreement. As always, general rules
will riot do, but the notion that exit rights are inherently undesirable
or destructive of political life simply does not withstand scrutiny.
D. Exit Ex Post
The final objection is that, even if exit rights are capable of doing
the normative task I assign them here, exit should at least be
prohibited when some kind of an executory obligation is pending and
has not been discharged (e.g., debts unpaid, or penalties or
punishments unexacted). Beran gives two examples of this for natural
persons in states: an imposed-but-not-served jail sentence and an
unperformed promise to work as a doctor for five years.213 Beran takes
the view-on the basis of his contractarian approach, criticized above-
that, in these cases, the consensual basis of legitimacy is unimpaired
when a state "prevent[s] . . . departure by force in order to be able to
enforce the penalty in question."21 4 This idea, or something like it, is
widely shared: it has been articulated by Joseph Tussman, in the
course of an account that otherwise prizes voluntariness,215 by Richard
Epstein in his work on federalism,216 and even by Hugo Grotius, who
wrote that
it is no Ways for the Benefit of a Civil Society, if there be any great publick Debt
contracted, for an Inhabitant to leave it, unless he be ready to pay down his
Proportion towards it: Or if a War be undertaken upon a Confidence in the
Number of Subjects to support it, and especially if a Siege be apprehended, no
Body ought to quit the Service of his Country, unless he substitutes another in
his Room, equally qualified to defend the State.217
213. BERAN, supra note 65, at 111-12.
214. Id.
215. TUSSMAN, supra note 77, at 39-40.
216. See Epstein, supra note 24, at 164.
217. GROTIUS, supra note 115, at 554-55.
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In international institutions, this concern finds expression in the
rule that withdrawal does not relieve a state of obligations accruing
before the date of withdrawal, including those accruing between the
tender of notice of intent to withdraw and withdrawal itself. Such a
rule can be found in the central treaties of a number of major
international organizations.2 1 8 In national orders, it amounts to the
rule that one cannot invoke rights of exit or emigration to leave the
state in order to avoid a pending criminal (or sometimes civil)
obligation. The idea carries genuine normative force: you have to settle
the check before you will be allowed to leave the restaurant.
In response to this, I want to suggest briefly that, while a
restriction of this kind has obvious intuitive appeal, it may not be as
necessary as it looks. It has already been noted that the combination
of benefits from membership, costs of exit (including reputational
costs), and attachment to the order or institution will make exit
unlikely in most circumstances and that this will be enough to ensure
that, in many cases, states and natural persons alike will stay in the
order or institution and take their medicine-even quite unpleasant
medicine-rather than turn their backs on the order. In practice, states
routinely accept unfavorable outcomes in international institutions
rather than storm for the exit door. So, it is not clear that it is always,
or even often necessary to prohibit ex post exit to get the members of
an order or institution to keep their promises, obey the rules, and pay
the penalties if they break the rules. It may be enough that exit is
costly, difficult, and may very well leave the (former) member much
worse off.
But, to answer the objection head-on, it is not quite clear that
there is a relevant difference between an obligation that has "accrued"
and any other obligation incident to membership in an order or
institution. The content-neutral claims of both types of obligation rest
on the fact of membership in the order or institution: the claims have
some measure of normative force for me because of the fact of my
membership in the order or institution (my citizenship, club
membership, my employee status, etc.). And, if I can-consistently
with the demand of what we have called the freedom aspect of political
autonomy-renounce the status in virtue of which I am subject to the
claims of the rules and norms of the order, it seems that that
renunciation drains the force from both types of obligation in much the
218. See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 58(2), Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 ("[A]
denunciation shall not have the effect of releasing the High Contracting Party concerned
from its obligations under this Convention in respect of any act which, being capable of
constituting a violation of such obligations, may have been performed by it before the
date at which the denunciation became effective.").
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same way.219 To give an easy example, suppose that I have for some
years been subject to the obligation, as a senior employee of
Normativity, Inc., to prepare and present a weekly report to the Board
of Directors every Monday morning, on pain of disciplinary action. But
today is Tuesday and I inexcusably failed to give my report yesterday.
I am now under (at least) two types of obligations: the accrued
obligation to submit to disciplinary action for my failure to give the
weekly report yesterday, and the executory obligation to prepare and
submit next Monday's report. If I now resign from the company rather
than submit to disciplinary action, both the executory obligation to give
next Monday's report and the accrued obligation to submit to the
penalty for missing the previous one fall away in the same way and for
the same reason. It is not clear to me that exit from a political order or
institution demands to be treated in a fundamentally different way.
Of course, there may be independent reasons, based for example
in considerations of fairness or justice, and having nothing to do with
the mantle of institutional membership, to discharge the relevant
accrued obligation-to pay a debt, serve jail time, pay back taxes, and
so on. If there is an adequate moral basis for a claim of this kind, then
such a claim may be normative, even strongly normative, for us,
however much we may wish to exit (and even if we do exit). For
example, suppose that, before my resignation from Normativity, Inc., I
had promised to help out at a local charity fundraiser, and I had done
so as part of the corporation's community relations and public service
program. (Perhaps the corporation requires every employee to perform
one act of public service a year, and this was to be mine for the year.)
Now, when I resign, the part of the obligation that is contingent on the
mantle of obligation that I formerly wore as an employee of
Normativity, Inc., falls away. But it is perfectly possible that some
other ground of obligation would remain and would still be normative
for me: for example, an obligation grounded in my promise to the
organizer of the event that I will show up and help out at the
fundraiser. And I might continue to accept the basis for that kind of
obligation even after setting aside the role of institutional membership.
The broader point should be clear: even from the perspective of political
autonomy, exit from an order or institution does not free us from the
219. The leading allusions to this point that I can find in the work of others
include Socrates' observation in the Crito that exile had been offered to him at trial-
implicitly invoking the availability of ex post exit as support for the legitimacy of the
Athenian order for him-and the observation of Charles Cassinelli n the context of
democratic government that "[a]n association is truly voluntary only when one can take
himself beyond its control at any time whatever. . . . There is no withdrawal from the
government's control when one has broken the rules; therefore, there can be no consent
to governmental regulation by those who have not consciously accepted it by means of
voluntary immigration." C.W. CASSINELLI, THE POLITICS OF FREEDOM: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE MODERN DEMOCRATIC STATE 92 (1961). But see BERAN, supra note 65, at 111
(discussing that exit limitations are consistent with voluntary membership).
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outstanding moral claims upon us when we freely continue to accept
an independent basis for those claims, whatever that basis might be.
Finally, it may be worth noting that exit often accomplishes or
renders unnecessary many of the purposes for which penalties and
punishments are often imposed. The details will depend, of course, on
the kind of order and the nature of the penalty or punishment. But it
is probably true that exit is usually unappetizing, burdensome, and
unpleasant enough that its availability need not diminish, or diminish
much, the ex ante deterrent effect of a penalty. And the option of exit
may also serve the function of protecting other members from the effect
of future violations. So, in at least some cases, and perhaps many cases,
exit may be just as effective as the penalty or punishment itself at
achieving the ends for which the penalty or punishment was instituted.
This point is aptly illustrated by the fact that a number of different
cultures have made exit rights-exile, banishment, transportation,
and so on-available as an alternative to the performance of criminal
obligations, even those which have accrued. We have already seen that
Socrates mentions in Crito that he was given, even at trial, the option
of exile as an alternative to death.220 In republican Rome, at certain
periods, condemned persons could accept exile in place of
punishment.221 The English penal system, at times, offered various
forms of exit as an alternative to traditional punishments.22 2 And, in
feudal Japan, warriors facing the dishonor of execution were afforded
the alternative to "exit," after a fashion, by committing suicide
instead.2 23 In each of these systems, the exit option did not appear to
undermine the effectiveness of the punishment mechanism from which
the violator was accorded the opportunity of exiting. In these respects
at least, those orders managed to preserve what I have called
"freedom"-and to protect what I have called the political autonomy of
their members-even when the tension between the order and a
member was at its most acute.
220. See PLATO, supra note 118 and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., J.A. CROOK, LAW AND LIFE OF ROME 272-73 (1967) (describing
different forms of exile as an alternative to punishment and as outright penalty); see also
MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, Pro Balbo, in CICERO: ORATIONS-PRO CAELIO; DE PROVINCIIS
CONSULARIBUS; PRO BALBO 657-61 (Harvard 1958).
222. See, e.g., FREDERICK POLLOCK & F.W. MAITLAND, II THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAw BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 619-20 (Liberty Press 2010) (1898) ("The
coroner came and parleyed with the refugee [criminal taking sanctuary in a church], who
had his choice between submitting to trial and abjuring the realm. If he chose the latter
course, he hurried dressed in pilgrim's guise to the port that was assigned to him, and
left England, being bound by his oath never to return."); BAKER, supra note 3, at 516
(noting the practice of granting a pardon on condition of transportation to a "wild and
uninviting territory" as an alternative to a death sentence).
223. See Lafcadio Hearn, The Call to Vengeance and the Code of Self-Sacrifice in





The basic claims of this Article can be summarized briefly. Exit
legitimacy is the contribution that a right of exit makes to the
legitimating resources available to an order or institution; that is, to
the reasons to accept or comply with the order or institution and with
its outputs (its rules, decisions, etc.). The normative force of exit
legitimacy is derived from the way in which exit rights help to
operationalize consent (on the "thin" account) and from the way in
which exit rights help to instantiate the freedom aspect of a value that
I have called political autonomy (on the "thick" account). And while exit
legitimacy can be discerned in many types of orders and institutions,
there are reasons to think that it is particularly important in the
international realm.
There are some important objections to exit legitimacy, but, of the
four considered here, none seems to be fatal. The first objection centers
on the cost and burden of exit: I argue that we need not worry unduly
that exit is often difficult, so long as it is a realistic possibility. The
second objection focuses on the insufficiency of exit rights: I emphasize
that exit alone is not enough to render an order or institution rightful
or just, and that exit cannot be a "solution" to problems of justice and
fairness, but insist that the presence of an exit right nevertheless
improves the legitimating resources available to the order or
institution in question. The third objection pertains to the incentive
problems created by exit rights: I suggest that exit should be
institutionalized thoughtfully in light of its effects on incentives and
behavior, and that it may be desirable in particular to design exit
rights that require (or at least facilitate) the use of voice before and
during exit. The fourth objection relates to the apparent need to
foreclose ex post exit: I give reasons to think that such foreclosure may
not be as necessary as it seems, and that we may be able to keep exit
available even for those who have broken the rules of our order or
institution and have not yet made restitution or submitted to
punishment.
The claims at the heart of this Article have been framed in highly
general terms: they apply to international organizations, states,
corporations, and voluntary associations of individuals in much the
same way. One cost of this approach is a high level of abstraction: a
great deal of work remains to be done before the foregoing analysis can
be translated into concrete doctrinal prescriptions. But the ground is
now prepared for such work, and a number of the principal objectives
and difficulties have been identified. An exit right designed with these
lessons in mind promises to harness a source of legitimacy that, despite
its vital importance, has hitherto remained largely in the dark.
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